

80 01195

pt.1

CITY AND COUNTY

OF SAN FRANCISCO



BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

BUDGET ANALYST

1182 MARKET STREET, ROOM 422

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 • TELEPHONE (415) 552-9292

March 26, 1979

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES LIBRARY

JUN 2 1980

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors
Room 235, City Hall
San Francisco, California 94102

Dear Madam Chairperson and Members:

Transmitted herewith is Part I (of two parts) of our management audit report of the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD). The SFPD is currently organized into four separate bureaus, each of which is headed by a Deputy Chief who reports to the Chief of Police. These four bureaus are (1) Field Operations, which includes the patrol and traffic divisions and the Crime specific Task Force (CSTF), (2) Investigations, (3) Administration, and (4) Support Services. In addition to these four bureaus, there are two sections (Intelligence and Internal Affairs) and a division (Crime Prevention/Education) which report directly to the Chief of Police.

San Francisco is divided into nine police districts. Each district has a separate police station which is under the responsibility of a Police Captain. The Captains of the district stations report to the Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Bureau. In some respects, however, the district stations operate as separate police departments which leads to problems of coordination in the SFPD.

In the 1978-79 fiscal year, the SFPD has an authorized staffing level of 2,507 permanent positions of which 1,853 are sworn police officer positions and the remaining 654 are non-sworn "civilian" positions. In addition to these authorized permanent positions, the SFPD has approximately 260 temporary non-sworn positions and 54

[Handwritten signature]

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

temporary sworn positions. In 1978-79, the SFPD has experienced considerable difficulty in filling its full number of authorized positions. The inability of the SFPD to fill its authorized sworn police officer positions is primarily due to the exhaustion of the civil service list for police officers and normal attrition from the department. These two factors have led to a situation where the current sworn strength for the department is approximately 1,620 police officers and the projected sworn strength due to attrition, by December, 1979, is 1,540 officers. As for the non-sworn positions, a variety of recruitment and hiring problems have been encountered. As a result of all of these difficulties, the SFPD is currently operating at substantially below its authorized personnel strength.

In the 1978-79 fiscal year, the authorized budget for the SFPD is \$82,610,826. In addition to the authorized City budget, approximately \$10 million in Federal funds support various police programs. These Federal programs have fixed termination dates or can be expected to be reduced substantially in the near future. Therefore, the SFPD may find that certain existing programs and services which are now supported with Federal funds will either have to be absorbed into the authorized City budget or terminated.

A nationwide survey of police practices in 50 metropolitan police departments shows that the SFPD has a relatively high cost per capita, an average number of authorized police positions per capita, a relatively high salary structure, relatively high retirement benefits, below average fringe benefits (other than retirement), relatively short time-in-service requirements for promotion eligibility, and a relatively high proportion of non-sworn positions compared to police officer positions.

The hiring and promotion practices of the SFPD have been a subject of legal controversy over the last several years. A preliminary settlement to this dispute, which concerned hiring and recruiting minorities and women, has now been reached. The settlement agreement would require that the City authorize and fill a total of 1,971 sworn police officer positions in the Department by August, 1981. The additional personnel cost of this settlement is approximately \$5 million per year based on current compensation levels. Over the next five years, the total personnel cost of this settlement will be approximately \$30 million. We advised against this settlement both on the grounds of the cost to the City and on the grounds that the required number of police officers was not based on an analysis of the actual need for that number of sworn positions. Our independent analysis indicates that if the SFPD were restructured and reorganized, the approximate number of sworn positions needed would be 1,677 which would allow for the current level of patrol services and a substantial increase in the number of police officers who could be assigned to specific investigative and crime-preventive activities.

The Board of Supervisors determined that certain factors gave the City little choice but to accept the settlement and the required number of 1,971 sworn officers as negotiated. These factors included Federal equal opportunity requirements and the risk of losing substantial sums of Federal revenue. Recognizing this policy decision by the City, we have recommended the assignment of 294 sworn officers to various programs including parking control, traffic control, MUNI security and City Hall security. We are also recommending that the replacement of sworn officers assigned to jobs not requiring police powers and training not be augmented beyond its current level. We believe that the implementation of these recommendations would provide for an effective use of the 1,971 sworn officer positions now required by City policy. Implementation of these recommendations would also produce an annual net benefit to the City of approximately \$10.5 million.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

Given the fact that San Francisco has made a commitment to employ more Police Officers than are necessary for the effective provision of police services, we are recommending substantial revisions in the utilization of sworn personnel. Using some of these police officers in police-related assignments is more cost-effective than retaining a full complement of non-sworn positions and an excessive number of police officers. We recognize that some of our recommendations are inconsistent with modern police practice and cost-control policies. Specifically, we note our recommendations to replace non-sworn positions with police officers in such areas as traffic control and parking control which would substitute relatively high-cost positions for much lower-cost positions.

Due to the size and complexity of the SFPD, we are issuing the results of our management audit in two separate reports. The first report focuses primarily on the deployment of personnel and equipment. Particular emphasis is placed on the Field Operations Bureau, which is the organizational unit of the SFPD which includes the patrol function. The second report will focus on broader management and administrative considerations, on the Investigations Bureau, and on other related divisions of the Department.

In this report, we have made recommendations which would substantially alter the present structure of the SFPD. Our recommendations call for changes in the current mix of sworn and non-sworn positions in virtually every division of the SFPD and would produce a net reduction of 220 non-sworn positions. Implementation of our recommendations would significantly increase police presence in high crime areas and would improve the delivery of police services city-wide. A summary of our findings and recommendations is as follows:

1. Significant improvements can be realized in the deployment of patrol personnel which will maintain the current level of district patrol, improve field supervision of patrol officers, and increase the number of police officers who can be assigned to specific crime-prevention activities with no requirement for additional personnel. We found that:

- Special assignment, other than routine patrol, of police officers required 189 full-time equivalent officers during the period January 9-26, 1979. However, of this number, the responsibilities of 55 full-time equivalent officers could be absorbed through district consolidation and a reduction of overlapping assignments.
- The assignment of patrol personnel to various work shifts does not correspond to the demand for police services as measured by citizen initiated calls for service. There is excess coverage during the daytime hours and insufficient coverage during the evening hours.
- Field supervision varies widely. During one 7-day period analyzed, there were 16 instances in which there was no supervising sergeant assigned to the field for specific patrol districts and watches.
- Meal breaks are not adequately monitored. Police officers are allowed a 1/2-hour paid meal break during their 8-hour shift. However, the SFPD has permitted sworn officers to take a 45-minute paid meal break as a normal practice and a sample of 488 SFPD dispatch records showed an average time of 54.4 minutes spent on meal breaks. The excess time spent on meal breaks

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

represents 5% of a patrol officer's total watch and translates into a loss of 50 full-time equivalent officers on a department-wide basis.

- Police officers who are assigned to patrol duties in district stations are frequently detailed to other duties thus reducing the effective deployment of personnel in the police districts.
- In spite of a commitment to maximize the use of one-person radio cars, the SFPD assigns one police officer to less than 10% of its radio cars. Two officers are assigned to all other patrol radio cars. Other police jurisdictions have reported favorable results from the use of one-person radio cars with necessary back-up in emergency situations. The SFPD currently dispatches two or more radio cars in emergency situations. Therefore sufficient radio cars already exist to provide adequate backup.
- There is strong indication that certain types of crimes, such as violent street crimes, can be reduced through the assignment of special police units to specific problem areas in response to identifiable patterns of crime.

Based on these findings, we have made a number of recommendations for improving the deployment of police officers. Among these recommendations are the following:

- Assign patrol officers in proportion to workload by time and day.
- Establish consistent supervision patterns through the assignment of field sergeants to all patrol shifts in all districts.
- Increase the use of one-person patrol cars from the current level of 9% to a level of 30% of all patrol cars assigned to the field.
- Assign an additional 160 police officers to a centralized unit for the purpose of special deployment in response to identifiable crime patterns and other special needs.
- Assign 78 additional police officers to the MUNI security program to replace CETA positions whose tenure will expire within 18 months.

2. Consolidating the existing nine district stations into three patrol stations will improve police deployment practices and police response capabilities and free 59 police officers who are currently assigned to station duty for more active patrol assignments. In our review of the current division of San Francisco into nine police districts, we found that:

- The existence of 9 district police stations reduces effective police presence in San Francisco neighborhoods below what would be possible if district stations were consolidated.
- Of all police officers assigned to district stations, approximately 12.8% (116 total officers) are assigned to administrative duties. If the nine stations were consolidated into three stations, 59 of these officers could be assigned to more active patrol duties.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

- The current district stations contribute to parking and traffic congestion in the neighborhood where they are located.
- Most calls for police services do not come to the district stations. More than 97% of all calls for police services are received at the Hall of Justice. Less than 1 person per hour visits a district police station and most of these visits are related to traffic offenses.
- By using vacant school sites and the Hall of Justice, the existing district stations could be consolidated into three stations without requiring any new construction.

Based on our review of the existing police districts we have recommended that the existing districts be consolidated into three districts. One of these stations would be located at the Hall of Justice. The other two stations would be located in the southeastern and western sections of the City respectively. Potential sites for these new stations include the following vacant schools: Fremont, Excelsior, Columbus, and Andrew Jackson. The Traffic Division would be relocated to the site of the existing Park District station.

3. Improvements in the responsiveness of patrol units could be achieved without the addition of sworn personnel. Our review of the dispatch of police officers to respond to calls for service revealed that:

- The average response time for calls for police services which are given top priority is 7.7 minutes. Of this time, 3.1 minutes is spent in the dispatch process and 4.6 minutes is spent in travel time.
- The average response time for calls for police services which are given low priority is 21.5 minutes. Of this time, and 6.3 minutes is spent in travel time.
- The current division of San Francisco into nine separate police districts and a SFPD policy not to dispatch police units across district boundaries except in special cases tend to increase response times.
- The availability of police units to respond to high priority calls is reduced by the dispatch process which is used for low priority calls.
- The dispatch function is separated organizationally from the patrol function.
- The SFPD does not have a performance standard for police response times.

Based on these findings we have made several recommendations which would improve the response time to calls for police services. Among these recommendations are the following:

- The SFPD should establish and monitor performance standards for police response times including a performance goal of no more than 5 minutes (dispatch and travel) for high priority calls.
- The dispatch function should be placed under the Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Bureau for better coordination with the patrol function.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

- The SFPD should increase dispatching across district boundaries in order to equalize workload.
- The procedure for dispatching police units to low priority calls should be changed to allow for greater flexibility to respond to high priority calls.

4. The SFPD has an excessive number of police officers on disability leave. We found that:

- At any given time there are approximately 100 San Francisco police officers on disability leave which is over 6% of the total uniformed force. By comparison, the disability rate for the Oakland Police Department is approximately 4% and the disability rate for the San Jose Police Department is approximately 2%.
- There is a clear pattern of disabling injuries to SFPD officers. More than half of those police officers on disability leave have experienced injuries to the back or knee. However, the SFPD does not have an established physical fitness standard which must be met by all police officers and which is designed to emphasize fitness in the areas where police officers are most likely to experience disabling injuries.
- There is an economic incentive for police officers to take disability leave in that disability pay, which equals full salary, is not subject to taxation.
- The Chief of Police submitted a revised weight standard for all police to the officers Police Commission on March 13, 1978, but this weight standard is still in the meet and confer process with the Police Officers Association.

Based on these findings we have recommended that:

- The SFPD develop physical fitness standards for all police officers and that these standards emphasize fitness in the areas where police officers are most likely to experience disabling injuries.
- The Police Commission adopt the weight standards recommended by the Chief of Police on March 13, 1978.
- The SFPD adopt a goal of a 50% reduction in the current disability rate.

5. Replacement of non-sworn parking control officers by sworn police officers and a development of performance goals for parking control could increase police presence, increase revenue to the General Fund by an estimated \$6 million annually and reduce costs by an estimated \$2.5 million annually. Our review revealed that:

- Parking Controllers are highly visible, but since they are not police officers and cannot conduct investigations or make arrests their presence is not an effective deterrent on crime.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

- The number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer during an 8-hour shift averaged 66.8 but varied from a high of 222 to a low of 7.
- The number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer in residential parking areas averaged approximately 53% of the number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer in all other areas of the City.
- Few Parking Control Officers work on Saturdays, but those who do issue an average of 40% more citations than Parking Control Officers working on other days of the week.
- The centralization of the parking control function at the Hall of Justice requires Parking Control Officers who work in the western half of the City to spend a substantial amount of time traveling to their parking beats.

Based on our findings, we have recommended that:

- Non-sworn parking control personnel be replaced with sworn police officers which would save \$2.5 million annually.
- Performance goals be established for all parking control personnel which would generate an additional \$6 million annually.
- The number of parking control personnel assigned to Saturdays be increased.

6. Replacing Traffic Control Officers with police personnel would increase police presence in the congested downtown area and would produce savings of over \$300,000 annually. We found that:

- The SFPD has 19 authorized Traffic Control Officer positions. Traffic Control Officers are not police officers, are not armed and cannot make arrests.
- Traffic Control Officers are assigned to busy intersections in the congested downtown area. During commute hours they facilitate the movement of traffic but in the middle part of the day there is less traffic and therefore less need for traffic controllers.
- Most of the traffic control sites are in close proximity to either high crime areas such as the Tenderloin and South of Market or downtown commercial districts which have been suggested as appropriate for the assignment of additional foot patrol officers.

Based on these findings, we have recommended that the Police Department assign the traffic control function to sworn police officers who can be reassigned to other duties during non-commute hours.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

7. The SFPD will have sufficient personnel to assign 22 police officers to City Hall security at no additional cost. We found that:

- Consideration is being given to the hiring of 22 private security guards at City Hall at an annual personnel cost of \$515,000.
- As an alternative to private security guards, consideration is being given to using CETA security guards at City Hall. However, the use of CETA personnel for this purpose is at best a short-term solution to the security problem given that the maximum tenure of current CETA employees is 18 months.
- The recently-adopted policy calling for 1,971 police officers for the SFPD would permit the assignment of 22 police officers to City Hall without seriously impacting the provision of police service elsewhere in the City.

Based on these findings we have recommended that the SFPD provide security at City Hall.

8. The SFPD has assigned clerical duties to Station Officer and Police Service Aide positions. We found that:

- The duties assigned to 12 Station Officer and 33 Police Service Aide positions in the SFPD are almost entirely clerical.
- The compensation paid to Station Officers and Police Service Aides is considerably more than the compensation paid to clerical personnel.

Based on our findings, we have recommended that the Station Officer and Police Service Aide positions in the Police Department be replaced with clerical personnel.

9. The SFPD has too many vehicles and makes inadequate use of those vehicles. We found that:

- Police vehicles are frequently idle. A count of police vehicles parked in the Hall of Justice garage over a six-day period revealed that an average of 94 unmarked cars (out of a total of 204 unmarked cars) were idle. In addition, an average of 13 marked cars were idle (out of 183 marked cars).
- 45 unmarked police cars are driven less than 6,000 miles per year and 13 unmarked cars are driven less than 3,600 miles per year.
- 26 marked police cars are driven less than 12 total miles during an average 8-hour patrol shift.
- There is a severe parking shortage at the Hall of Justice and at many district police stations.
- The SFPD does not have a central pool for its vehicles, but instead assigns its vehicles to a number of "mini-pools" each of which includes reserve vehicles.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

Based on our findings, we have made a number of recommendations including:

- All unmarked police cars be centralized into one vehicle pool controlled from the Hall of Justice garage.
- All back-up marked police cars be centralized into one pool.
- 50 unmarked police vehicles be eliminated from the SFPD fleet.

10. The maintenance and repair program for SFPD vehicles is inadequate, costly and contributes to an underutilization of police vehicles. Maintenance and repair of police vehicles is performed by the City's Central Shops. However, we found that the Police Department's own vehicle management practices are also inadequate. Specifically, we found that:

- 9% to 14% of the police vehicle fleet is out of service at any given time.
- During the 1977-78 fiscal year, 31% of marked cars and 15% of unmarked cars were involved in accidents.
- Routine maintenance is often not performed.
- Vehicles taken out of service for repairs are often left sitting for several days both before the repair work is performed and after the repair work is completed.

Some police vehicles receiving major repairs are subsequently sold for a price which is substantially less than the cost of the repairs.

- Regular inspections of police vehicles are not routinely performed.
- An authorized fleet manager position for the SFPD has not been filled due to delays in the civil service classification procedure.

Based on our findings, we have recommended that the SFPD take a number of actions including:

- Fill the vacant fleet manager position.
- Establish a policy of routine inspections of all vehicles.
- Maintain a maintenance and repair history file in each vehicle.
- Identify vehicles which are scheduled for replacement and specify that such vehicles not receive major repair and maintenance work.
- Establish a policy whereby all police vehicles are picked up from the Central Shops garage within four hours of the time when work on those vehicles is completed.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

11. Records, security and control procedures are inadequate in the property control section of the SFPD which handles \$1.5 million in property and over \$150,000 in cash annually. Disclosure of our finding on this matter led to a criminal investigation. Storage facilities and packaging practices in the crime lab are deficient. We found that:

- 22% of a sample of 106 evidence envelopes containing cash could not be located.
- A separate record of cash evidence was not maintained.
- Cash evidence is not carefully described on property enveloped.
- Several envelopes containing cash were torn or opened and in one case, in the safe, property was kept in a large brown bag which was ripped open in two places.
- Routine audits of the SFPD property section have not been conducted.
- The crime lab has insufficient secure storage space for bulk controlled substances such as marijuana.

Based on our findings, we have recommended that the SFPD take a number of actions including the following:

- Implement necessary internal control and record procedures in the property section and conduct periodic, routine sample audits of property.
- Insure that items in property envelopes are correctly described on the outside of the envelopes.
- Provide the crime lab with adequate storage space for controlled substances.

12. Revenues received for special services provided by the SFPD cover less than 31% of the cost of these services. We found that:

- In spite of Charter requirements that fees for licenses and permits at least cover all costs of regulation and inspection, the revenue received from such permits and licenses is \$650,000 below the costs of regulation and inspection on an annual basis.
- 98% of all alarms to which police units are dispatched are false alarms. The cost of responding to such alarms is approximately \$300,000 annually.
- Private firms, such as film companies and the San Francisco Giants, hire SFPD officers at a rate which is substantially less than the cost of maintaining those officers.

Based on our findings, we have recommended that the SFPD prepare and the Board of Supervisors approve:

- An amended fee structure for permits and licenses regulated by the SFPD.

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

- An alarm permit ordinance requiring a \$15 fee for each response to an alarm.
- An amended Administrative Code section permitting the hiring of police officers by private firms to require full cost reimbursement by such firms.

We have discussed our findings and recommendations in detail with the Chief of Police and the Deputy Chiefs. The written response of the Police Department is appended to the end of our management audit report beginning on page 63. The Police Department is in complete agreement with our findings and recommendations concerning consolidation of district stations (#2), appropriate use of clerical personnel (#8), control of evidence (#11), and fees for special police services (#12). The Police Department is in general agreement with our findings and recommendations on use and maintenance of police vehicles (#9, #10). However, the Department states that the Hall of Justice garage is not large enough to accomodate a central vehicle pool. We would respond that the creation of a consolidated pool of those police vehicles which are located in the Hall of Justice garage would greatly alleviate the problems that we have identified and would permit our recommendations to be largely implemented. The SFPD is also in general agreement with our finding on excessive disability (#4) although they note, correctly, that the SFPD is not solely responsible for the disability rate of its personnel. Except for the transfer of the dispatch function, the SFPD is in agreement with our finding on improving response time (#3), and except for our recommendation to replace Parking Control Officers with sworn personnel, the SFPD agrees with our finding on increasing parking fine revenue through an implementation of performance goals (#5).

The Police Department's main disagreement with our report concerns the appropriate number of police officers for the Department. The SFPD takes issue with our position that 1,677 sworn personnel would be sufficient to provide police services to San Francisco. The SFPD claims that we have not considered special duties which are currently assigned to police officers including providing security at parades and special events and providing back-up staffing and temporary relief for other units in the SFPD. The SFPD claims that our recommendation to increase the number of one-person patrol cars does not provide for appropriate officer safety in times of emergency. Finally, the SFPD states that our recommendation to triple the size of the centralized crime specific unit (from 80 officers to 240 officers) is not sufficient because we have also recommended that this unit take on additional responsibilities currently assigned to the district stations as well as perform a major crime prevention role.

Because the SFPD does not agree that 1,677 sworn personnel would be sufficient to provide police services to San Francisco, they also do not agree with our recommendations to replace non-sworn personnel in police-related functions such as traffic control, parking control, MUNI security and City Hall security with sworn police officers. The position of the Police Department is that the sworn positions that we recommend be assigned to these police-related functions could more effectively be utilized in other crime-prevention activities.

Our response to the Police Department's position on the appropriate number of sworn officers for the SFPD is that our recommendations are based on an analysis of how existing police practices can be improved. Our review of the special assignments of police officers referred to in the SFPD response to our report indicates that the existing overtime and holiday pay accounts in the Police Department are sufficient to accomodate these needs. These funds provide for the equivalent of an additional 70 to 80 police officers and were not included in our calculations of an appropriate sworn strength

Honorable Carol Ruth Silver
Chairperson, and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors

March 26, 1979

for the SFPD. We estimate that at least half of these positions could be made available for special assignment. As to the question of security for one-person patrol cars, it is now common practice for back-up radio cars to be dispatched in emergency situations and we would expect that this practice would continue. Finally, with regard to the appropriate size and responsibilities for a centralized crime-prevention unit, we are confident that tripling the size of the current unit from 80 officers to 240 officers can have a significant impact on crime in San Francisco if this unit is appropriately utilized.

We wish to thank the Chief of Police, the Deputy Chiefs and personnel throughout the SFPD for cooperating with our efforts on this management audit. In general, we found persons at all levels of the Department to be open, cooperative and willing to help. Without their assistance, our task would have been extremely difficult.

Respectfully submitted,



HARVEY M. ROSE

Staff: Phil Arnold
Ken Bruce
Chris Papesh
Roger Mialocq
Monique Zmuda*
Marjorie Hilsenrad*
Brad Onorato*
Leo Lim*

*CETA funded staff assigned to Budget Analyst's office through December 31, 1978.

cc: President Molinari
Supervisor Britt
Supervisor Dolson
Supervisor Gonzales
Supervisor Horanzy
Supervisor Hutch
Supervisor Kopp
Supervisor Lau
Supervisor Pelosi
Supervisor Renne
Clerk of the Board
Mayor Feinstein
Chief of Police
Police Commissioners
Controller
City Attorney
Chief Administrative Officer
General Manager, Personnel, Civil Service
Rudy Nothenberg

REPORT
TO THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
(Part 1)

BUDGET ANALYST
FOR THE
SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
MARCH, 1979

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
FINDINGS	
DEPLOYMENT OF PATROL OFFICERS	7
Significant improvements can be realized in the deployment of patrol personnel. A more effective level of patrol services could be provided by assigning additional police officers to specialized police units which can be deployed to meet particular objectives.	
CONSOLIDATION OF DISTRICT STATIONS	16
Consolidating the existing nine district stations into three patrol stations will improve police services and free 59 police officers who are currently assigned to station duty for more active patrol assignments.	
POLICE RESPONSE TIME	22
Improvements in the responsiveness of patrol units could be achieved without the addition of sworn personnel.	
EXCESSIVE DISABILITY	27
The San Francisco Police Department has excessive number of police officers who are on disability leave due to accidents and injuries.	
PARKING CONTROL	29
Replacement of non-sworn parking control officers by sworn police officers and a development of performance goals for parking control could increase police presence, increase revenue to the general fund by an estimated \$6 million annually and reduce costs by an estimated \$2.5 million annually.	

TRAFFIC CONTROL	33
Replacing traffic control officers with police officers would increase police presence in the congested downtown area and would produce savings of over \$300,000 annually.	
CITY HALL SECURITY	35
Providing private security guards to improve City Hall security would require an expenditure of \$515,000 annually. Considering the settlement requirement that San Francisco maintain 1,971 sworn police personnel, the SFPD will have sufficient manpower to assign 22 police officers to City Hall security at no additional cost.	
USE OF CLERICAL PERSONNEL	37
The Police Department has assigned clerical duties to station officer and police service aide positions working at the Hall of Justice and at district stations. These duties could be performed by clerical personnel at a substantial savings.	
VEHICLE USE	40
The Police Department has too many vehicles and makes inadequate use of those vehicles.	
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR	43
The maintenance and repair program for police vehicles is inadequate and costly and contributes to an underutilization of police vehicles.	
CONTROL OF EVIDENCE	46
Records, security and control procedures are inadequate in the Property Control Section of the Police Department and storage facilities and packaging practices in the Crime Lab are deficient.	

FEES FOR SPECIAL POLICE SERVICES	50
Revenues received for special services provided by the Police Department cover less than 31% of the cost of these services in spite of charter requirements and charge rates which are designed to provide recovery of costs.	
ATTACHMENTS	53
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	61
WRITTEN RESPONSE FROM POLICE DEPARTMENT	63

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to a motion adopted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, we have conducted a management audit of the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD). In conducting this management audit, we made use of a wide variety of informational sources. We reviewed the existing literature on the organization and operation of police departments in large metropolitan areas. We interviewed key personnel in other Bay Area police departments which operate under conditions similar to those in San Francisco. We analyzed previous studies which have been made of the San Francisco Police Department and appropriate sections of the San Francisco Charter. We reviewed Rules and Procedures adopted by the Police Commission and General Orders issued by the Chief of Police. We interviewed personnel at all levels and in all operating units of the San Francisco Police Department. We rode in patrol cars throughout the City and simulated various aspects of police work where appropriate. Many of our findings, conclusions and recommendations are consistent with those of other studies which have been made of the San Francisco Police Department. However, these consistencies, where they exist, are the product of our independent investigation rather than any pre-conceived notion of how the San Francisco Police Department should be organized and operated.

The San Francisco Police Department functions pursuant to Article III, Chapter Five, Part Four of the San Francisco Charter. Charter sections provide for the organization of the Police Department, special powers of the Chief of Police, uniformed ranks within the Police Department, executive positions within the Police Department, the appointment of Inspectors, appointment and qualifications of Patrol Special Officers, Traffic regulations, special police funds for general investigations and the authority of the Board of Supervisors over any change in the number or location of district police stations.

Under the Charter, a Police Commission, consisting of five members appointed to a 4-year term by the Mayor, has the duty to organize and manage the Police Department. The Police Commission appoints the Chief of Police who serves at the pleasure of the Commission. The Police Commission has the power to create uniformed ranks in the Police Department beyond those which are established in the Charter. Subject to the budgetary and personnel provisions of the Charter, the Police Commission has complete responsibility for the operation of the Police Department.

Currently, the San Francisco Police Department is organized into four separate bureaus, each of which is headed by a Deputy Chief who reports to the Chief of Police. The four bureaus are (1) Field Operations, which includes the patrol and traffic divisions and the Crime Specific Task Force, (2) Investigations, (3) Support Services, and (4) Administration. In addition to these four bureaus, there are two sections (Intelligence and Internal Affairs) and a division (Crime Prevention/Education) which report directly to the Chief of Police (see Attachment I which illustrates the organization of the Police Department).

San Francisco is divided into nine police districts (see Attachment II which illustrates the boundaries of these districts). Each district has a separate police station which is under the responsibility of a Police Captain. The Captains of the district stations report to the Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Bureau. In some respects, however, the district stations operate as separate police departments. Within the framework of general and specific orders from the Police Chief and the Deputy Chief in charge of Field Operations, the Captains of the district stations determine the specific

assignments of their station personnel and effective patrol beat coverage. Although the dispatch of patrol officers in response to calls for police service is centralized at the Hall of Justice, assignments are made within district boundaries and district station supervisory personnel can over-ride central dispatch orders.

In addition to the patrol services provided by the district stations, there are two centralized divisions which provide police services city-wide. These two divisions are the Traffic Division, which has primary responsibility for enforcing all traffic and parking regulations, and the Crime-Specific Division (CSTF) which is a flexible unit operating in high crime areas of the City in response to identifiable crime patterns. Of the approximately 1,125 police officers assigned to the patrol function in December, 1978, 903 were assigned to the nine district stations. Of the remaining officers, 121 were assigned to the Traffic Division 80 were assigned to the Crime-Specific Division, and 21 were assigned to administrative duties. Thus, although patrol services are provided on both a centralized and a decentralized basis in San Francisco, the balance is heavily weighted on the side of decentralization.

The Investigations, Support Services and Administration Bureaus are located in the Hall of Justice as are the Intelligence and Internal Affairs Sections. The Crime Prevention/Education Division has storefront locations throughout San Francisco but its central office is located in the Hall of Justice. Thus, the non-patrol functions of the San Francisco Police Department are physically centralized at one location.

In the 1978-79 fiscal year, the San Francisco Police Department has an authorized staffing level of 2,507 permanent positions. Of this total, 1,853 (74%) of the total are sworn police officers (one of whom is assigned to the Airport) and the remaining 654 (26%) are non-sworn "civilian" positions. The 2,507 positions authorized for the Police Department in the 1978-79 budget include 237 new positions, an increase of 10.1% from the authorized level of positions in 1977-78. Of these new positions, 100 are additional uniformed police officer positions and 137 are non-sworn "civilian" positions. Of the additional non-sworn positions, 87 (65%) were authorized for the express purpose of relieving for patrol work sworn police officers who are currently assigned to desk jobs. The remaining 47 non-sworn positions were authorized for the replacement of 16 temporary positions, the operation of a new parking control program (29 positions) and the continuation of 5 positions approved through a supplemental budget appropriation in 1977-78.

In 1978-79, the Police Department has experienced considerable difficulty in filling its full number of authorized positions. In February, 1979, the uniformed strength of the Department stood at 1,620 and of the 87 new non-sworn positions authorized to relieve police officers assigned to desk jobs for patrol work, only 20 positions had been filled. The inability of the Department to fill its authorized sworn police officer positions is primarily due to the exhaustion of the civil service list for police officers and normal attrition from the Department. A new list is currently being developed, but it will not be certified until August, 1979 at the earliest. Once a list is certified, the process of background investigations and training of police recruits requires between eight and nine months. Of this period, 18 weeks is spent in the training academy. Thus the actual number of uniformed police officers in San Francisco who are available for assignment will continue to decline until at least December, 1979 which is the earliest that a training class from the new civil service list could graduate. By that time, if attrition remains constant, the number of sworn police officers in the San Francisco Police Department will have dropped from its current strength of approximately 1,620 to approximately 1,540.

As for the non-sworn positions, a variety of recruitment and hiring problems have been encountered. Some of the positions were new classifications and therefore were subject to a civil service position survey before they could be filled. Other positions were authorized for classifications for which no civil service list of eligible candidates is currently available. The result of all of these recruitment and hiring difficulties is that the Police Department is currently operating at substantially below its authorized personnel strength.

In the 1978-79 fiscal year, the authorized budget for the Police Department is \$82,610,826. This budget compares to the 1977-78 approved budget (including supplemental budget appropriations) of \$76,200,611 and the 1976-77 actual expenditures of \$73,555,286. Of the total Police Department budget, 83.4% is provided from City General Fund revenues, 9.3% is provided from traffic fine and parking meter revenues, 6.9% is provided from Federal revenue sharing funds, and the remaining .4% is provided from miscellaneous charges and fees for police services.

In addition to the authorized City budget for the Police Department, approximately \$10 million in Federal funds support various police programs during the current fiscal year. Of this total, approximately \$3.5 million is provided under the Anti-recessionary (Public Works) program, approximately \$1.5 million is provided under the Community Development program, approximately \$2.5 million is provided under the CETA program, and approximately \$2.4 million is provided for Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) programs. Approximately 260 temporary non-sworn positions and 54 sworn positions in the Police Department are supported by these various Federal programs.

These temporary positions are in addition to the permanent authorized positions in the Police Department. These positions have been assigned to a number of programs including Muni Security, the Citizen's Safety Project (Project SAFE), recruitment and hiring of bilingual police officers and general administrative and clerical support services. Most of the Federal programs which support these positions have fixed termination dates or else can be expected to be reduced substantially in the near future. LEAA grants generally have a maximum duration of three years; the anti-recessionary program has already been terminated; and all current CETA employees have a maximum 18-month tenure. Therefore, the Police Department may find that certain existing programs and services which are now supported with Federal funds will either have to be absorbed into the authorized City budget or terminated.

A nationwide survey of police practices in 50 metropolitan police departments shows that the San Francisco Police Department has a relatively high cost per capita, an average number of authorized police positions per capita, a relatively high salary structure, relatively high retirement benefits, below average fringe benefits (other than retirement), relatively short time-in-service requirements for promotion eligibility, and a relatively high proportion of non-sworn positions compared to police officer positions.

The hiring and promotion practices of the San Francisco Police Department have been a subject of legal controversy over the last several years. A preliminary settlement to this dispute, which concerned hiring and recruiting minorities and women, has now been reached. The settlement agreement requires that the City authorize and fill a total of 1,971 sworn positions in the Police Department by August, 1981. This required number of sworn positions was not based on an in-depth analysis of need for police positions such as we have conducted in our management audit of the Police Department. Rather, it was the result of negotiations between the plaintiffs and the City. The settlement agreement is a long-term commitment by the City. The 1,971 sworn positions must be maintained

until at least August 1, 1984. The additional personnel cost of this settlement is approximately \$5 million annually based on current compensation levels in the Police Department. Assuming an 8% annual increase in compensation levels (including salary and fringe benefits) over the next 5 years, the total personnel cost of this settlement will be approximately \$30 million by August 1, 1984.

We advised against this settlement both on the grounds of the cost to the City and on the grounds that the required number of police officers was not based on an analysis of the actual need for that number of sworn positions in the San Francisco Police Department. Our independent analysis indicates that if the SFPD were restructured and reorganized, the approximate number of sworn positions needed would be 1,677 distributed as follows:

Recommended Distribution of Sworn Positions in the SFPD

District Patrol - Street Duty (radio cars)	476
District Patrol - Station Duty	57
District Patrol - Special Duty	157
CSTF	240
Traffic Patrol	142 *
Administration, Hall of Justice	100
Bureau of Inspectors	325 *
Disability	50
Training	120
Muni Security	10
Total Sworn Officers	<u>1,677</u>

*Current authorized level. These sections of the SFPD will be reviewed in Part II of our management audit.

This recommended number of police officers was based on a review of population trends, economic conditions, crime rates and police response time. The calculation of this number also assumed a rational deployment of police officers, a replacement of police officers currently assigned to desk jobs by non-sworn "civilian" personnel, a tripling of the number of police officers assigned to the CSTF and an increase in the number of one-person radio cars. However, the Board of Supervisors determined that other factors gave the City little choice but to accept the settlement as negotiated. Such factors included Federal equal opportunity requirements and the risk of losing substantial sums of Federal revenue. Now that this settlement has been adopted as City policy, any recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Police Department must take the requirements of the settlement into account if such recommendations are to be offered as real policy alternatives. Therefore we have recommended the assignment of an additional 294 sworn officers to various programs including Parking Control, Traffic Control, Muni security, City Hall security, and no further replacement of police officers in desk jobs after the currently-authorized replacement program is completed. These recommendations are shown in the following table.

Recommended Allocation of SFPD Personnel
Based on City Policy of 1,971 Sworn Positions

	Present Assignment*		Recommended Allocation	
	<u>Sworn</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Sworn</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
District Patrol				
- Street Patrol	506 **	-	476 **	-
- Station Assignment	116	41	57	41
- Special Duty	208	55	157	55
CSTF	80	7	240	7
Traffic Patrol***	139	17	142	17
Parking Control	3	118	155	-
Traffic Control	-	16	19	-
Hall of Justice- Admin.	192	434	120	544
Investigations				
Bureau***	325	35	325	35
City Hall Security	-	-	22	-
Muni Security	10	92	88	-
Disability	100	-	50	-
Trainee	31	-	120	-
Vacant	198	104	0	-
 	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Personnel	<u>1,907 ****</u>	<u>919 *****</u>	<u>1,971</u>	<u>699</u>

*Based on December, 1978 personnel data.

**239 radio units.

***Our review of these functions will be in the forthcoming management audit report (Part II).

****54 of these positions are federally- funded.

*****Includes temporary employees.

In the sections which follow, we have made recommendations which would substantially alter the present structure of the Police Department. Our recommendations would alter the current employment mix of sworn and non-sworn positions in virtually every division of the Police Department and would produce a net reduction of 220 non-sworn positions. Implementation of our recommendations would significantly increase police presence in high crime areas and would improve the delivery of police services city-wide. We believe that the implementation of our recommendations would provide for an effective use of the level of 1,971 sworn police officers required by City policy. Our recommendations in this report would increase net City revenues by \$6.8 million annually and reduce Police Department costs by \$3.7 million annually or a total annual benefit to the City of \$10.5 million annually. Our working papers, which provide documentation for all of our findings and recommendations, are available for the inspection of all interested parties.

We recognize that some of our recommendations are inconsistent with modern police practice and cost-control policies. Specifically, we note our recommendations to replace non-sworn positions with police officers in such areas as traffic control and parking control. Such a replacement substitutes relatively high-cost positions for much lower-cost positions and would appear to contradict efforts to reduce the cost of government. However, given the fact that San Francisco has made a commitment to employ more Police Officers than are necessary for the effective provision of police services, using some of these police officers in police-related assignments is more cost-effective than retaining a full complement of non-sworn positions and an excessive number of police officers.

Due to the size and complexity of the Police Department, we are issuing the results of our management audit in two separate reports. The first report focuses primarily on the deployment of personnel and equipment. Particular emphasis is placed on the Field Operations Bureau, which is the organizational unit of the Police Department which includes uniformed police officers who are assigned to a patrol function. The second report will focus on broader management and administrative considerations, on the Investigations Bureau, which is the organizational unit of the Police Department which includes criminal investigators, and on other related divisions of the Department.

The purpose of a management audit is to discover and recommend ways to improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of an organization. Therefore, the principal findings of a management audit may, because of its purpose, be viewed as critical of the subject organization. In the case of the San Francisco Police Department, we have made recommendations for major changes in policy and organization which result from what we believe are current deficiencies in the Department. However, these deficiencies should be balanced, to some extent, against more positive findings. Specifically, we would note the recruit training program, including the field training program, which appears to have contributed to a substantial upgrading in the quality of San Francisco police services. We would also point to an ongoing effort within the Police Department to improve the use of crime analysis data for the purpose of reallocating existing departmental resources in response to identifiable patterns of crime. The use of such data is still in its beginning stages in San Francisco. Much remains to be done in order to communicate the results of central management analysis and planning to the level of the patrol beat. Nonetheless, the Department is heading in the right direction in this area. Finally, we would note the dedication of the senior staff within the Police Department and their commitment to finding ways to improve the operations of the Department. In order for an organization to make major policy changes, it must have a leadership which is willing to give up existing patterns and structures. We have found that the current leadership in the San Francisco Police Department is quite willing to make changes provided that it can be demonstrated that such changes are likely to improve the delivery of police services.

We wish to thank the Chief of Police, the Deputy Chiefs and personnel throughout the San Francisco Police Department for cooperating with our efforts on this management audit. In general, we found persons at all levels of the Department to be open, cooperative and willing to help. Without their assistance, our task would have been extremely difficult.

SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE REALIZED IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF PATROL PERSONNEL. A MORE EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF PATROL SERVICES COULD BE PROVIDED BY ASSIGNING ADDITIONAL POLICE OFFICERS TO SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED TO MEET PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES.

Police patrol workload is measurable in terms of "calls for service" (e.g. responding to citizen complaints, reports of crime activity, providing needed assistance to victims, etc.) and "preventive patrol time" during which the primary function of the patrol officer is to maintain a police presence in the community in order to deter crime. Certain types of crime are considered to be patrol preventable. On-street robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and pursesnatch are examples. Although there is no measurable, statistical association between the level of crime on a city-wide basis and the amount of police presence, preventive patrol is considered an important function. Further, evaluations have shown that in specific areas, and for specific types of crime such as on-street robbery, an increased patrol presence can have a positive effect over the short term.

There are no generally accepted standards applied with regard to the amount of time required for calls for service relative to preventive patrol time. At one time, the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) recommended that 37% of a patrol radio unit's time should be devoted to responding to calls for service with the remainder of a unit's time allocated to preventive patrol, including officer initiated activities such as traffic stops, and certain administrative functions such as report writing. Since that recommendation was made however, the 37% standard has been rejected by both POST and SFPD management as being arbitrary and without theoretical basis. There is no existing normative framework within which to make a decision as to how much time is desirable and necessary for preventive patrol. The SFPD has not specified a goal for the ratio of call for service time versus preventive patrol activity.

A significant and often cited experiment that attempted to test the value of preventive patrol was conducted in Kansas City, Missouri with results published in 1974. For this experiment, three patrol areas were selected on the basis of similarity. One patrol area was labeled 'reactive' and no routine, preventive patrol was assigned (the only police presence was provided by responding to calls for service in the reactive area). A second area was labeled 'proactive' and saturated with a greater than usual (2 to 3 times) amount of preventive patrol. A third area was used for the control of experimental conditions, and the level of preventive patrol remained the same. In summary, the results of this experiment demonstrated that the level of preventive patrol assigned to an area had no measurable effect on the level of crime activity, citizens' perception of public safety or the length of time required for patrol units to respond to calls for service. Also, the experiment concluded that purposeless patrol often resulted in an officer's time being spent on nonpolice activities unrelated to law enforcement.

In an analysis and independent review of the Kansas City experiment, Richard C. Larson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) brought forth valid, methodological criticisms but found that the experiment nonetheless produced some useful results. Larson concluded that

"It (the Kansas City experiment) implies that if conditions warrant a change in the spatial deployment of units within a confined region such as a precinct, district, or division, then if procedures are followed that are similar to those used in Kansas City, such redeployments can be made without suffering marked degradations in service (either actual or perceived) in the depleted regions.... Changing crime patterns and other factors affecting public safety would seem to motivate the need for such flexible and focused deployments".

Larson's conclusion suggests that improved patrol services would result if allocation strategies were less rigid and that negative effects from the absence of preventive patrol in low crime areas would not occur if patrol units were occasionally reassigned to high crime areas and that sufficient police presence would be provided merely by responding to calls for service in the 'reactive' patrol areas.

To measure the call for service workload, the Budget Analysts sampled 'complaint record' (CR) slips which serve as source documentation of calls for service and patrol dispatch. Two systematic, random samples were drawn. One sample covered the period from November, 1977 to August, 1978 and the other sample covered the month of January, 1979. In all, over 6,000 CR slips were examined. An equal number of days of the week were sampled.

A second source of information used was a draft report of an analysis performed by the Police Department's Planning and Research Office. The approach taken for this study was to keypunch all call for service dispatch information for a six-week period during 1977. The results of this complete enumeration over a shorter period of time were in substantial agreement with our randomly selected sample. For example, the average call for service time determined by the Planning and Research study was approximately 39 minutes. The Budget Analyst's sample yielded results that specified a total average travel time and time at the scene of 39.2 minutes per call for service.

The objective of the Police Department's Planning and Research team study was to equalize the call for service workload by re-drawing unit patrol area ("beat") boundaries and recommending specific assignments of patrol radio units by patrol district, day of the week and watch. These recommendations have not been implemented by the Police Department pending further analysis with the assistance of a team of researchers from POST.

An analysis of the call for service workload employing some basic assumptions concerning productive time versus time-off due to meal breaks, etc. provides useful information on a baseline number of patrol personnel required to meet the demand for services and provide sufficient time for preventive patrol. The following assumptions have been used in this analysis: an average of 3 weeks vacation per officer per year; 13 sick days per year; 12 holidays; 70% of all radio units staffed by two officers per car and 30% of all radio units staffed by one officer; field supervision in proportion to current department-wide ratios for sergeants, lieutenants and captains. Using the derived data for average number of calls for service and average time required per call and assuming that 35% of a patrol unit's time should be devoted to calls for service with the remainder allocated to preventive patrol, self-initiated activities, meal breaks, briefings, and other administrative duties, the number of sworn personnel required for responding to calls for service would be 476 including 407 police officers and 69 supervising sergeants. This number of patrol personnel in the field would be supplemented by 31 lieutenants and 9 captains who have supervisory responsibilities in the 9 district stations. By comparison, 714 sworn police officers and sergeants were assigned to the City's 9 district stations for

patrol purposes during the period January 9-26, 1979. In addition, 9 Captains, 35 Lieutenants, 36 Sergeants and 33 Police Officers were detailed to the district stations for administrative functions.

The difference between the number of police positions assigned to district stations and the number of positions that we calculate are necessary to respond to calls for police services can be explained by four principal factors, detailed as follows:

Special Assignment

Police officers are often detailed to responsibilities which go beyond responding to calls for service. In addition to responding to calls for service, a number of specialized services are provided by the Patrol Division. Some, such as the Police Wagons used for prisoner pick-up, provide support to units in the field. Others, such as patrol officers assigned to neighborhood schools, are forms of directed patrol that address specific law enforcement objectives. The following discussion of these specialized services is based on actual personnel assignments during the period January 9-26, 1979.

Police wagons are assigned to pick up prisoners from district stations and transport them to the Hall of Justice. Under current procedures, these arrested persons are booked twice, once at the district station and once at the Hall of Justice. On average, the number of police wagon shifts for this purpose amounts to approximately 14 per day, requiring 26 officers per day and a total of 41 officers to staff this function on a full-time equivalent basis. Noting a wide disparity in the utilization of police wagons, with some districts in the western portion of the City requiring few pick-ups, the Deputy Chief of Field Operations is in the process of consolidating the booking function which would reduce the need for police wagons. However, the consolidation of district stations as proposed in the following section of this report would permit further reductions. With one station located at the Hall of Justice itself, a total of 5 wagons would be required per day, (2 per day in the Western patrol district and 3 per day in the Southern patrol district). To staff this deployment of patrol wagons, a total of 16 police officers would be required on a full-time equivalent basis rather than the 41 positions now assigned to patrol wagons.

An average of 7 police officers are currently assigned to neighborhood schools on a 5-day a week basis. This service was implemented in response to increasing violence on certain high school campuses and is generally regarded as a valuable means of deterring criminal activity in the schools. The current level of deployment for this purpose appears warranted.

Approximately 30 police officers are now assigned to 'Civilian Dress Patrol' out of the existing district stations. Their primary purpose is to act as special investigative units for burglaries and robberies. On any given day, approximately 19 officers are assigned for this purpose, with the majority working the day watch.

Approximately 30 full-time equivalent police officers are assigned to parking control functions to supplement the parking officers who are assigned to the Traffic Division and the district stations. In the section of this report which focuses on the parking control function, we demonstrate that the Police Department does not fully utilize its existing parking control personnel. We therefore believe that the functions of these officers could be absorbed by parking control personnel.

Approximately 82 full-time equivalent officers are assigned to foot patrol in congested areas, commercial districts and residential neighborhoods. We recognize that

officers assigned to foot patrol are generally not as flexible as officers in radio cars in that foot patrol officers cannot easily be dispatched out of their assigned areas to respond to emergency situations in other areas of the City. However, we also recognize the value of foot patrol officers and therefore are not recommending any change in current deployment of these officers.

In summary, special assignment of police officers to duties not including responding to calls for service required 189 full-time equivalent officers during the period January 9-26, 1979. Of this number, the responsibilities of 55 full-time equivalent officers could be absorbed through district consolidation and a more effective use of existing personnel. Therefore, in addition to the 476 police officer positions that we have identified as necessary to respond to calls for service, an additional 157 positions, including 134 police officers and 23 supervising sergeants, would be required for these specialized duties.

Inefficient Deployment

A second factor which helps explain the difference between the number of police officers assigned to patrol and the number of officers that we calculate are necessary for this function is inefficient deployment. The division of the City into 9 separate patrol districts, each with a district station facility, contributes to inefficient deployment. Minimum staffing must be provided on an around-the-clock basis at each station, thus adding to the required number of officers assigned to the patrol function. (See our finding # 2 in this report for discussion and recommendations concerning consolidation of patrol districts.) The patrol district alignment also prevents optimum dispatching procedures since radio units are not dispatched across district boundaries except for emergencies and at times when all units are busy in a particular district and a large number of 'stacked' calls for service are waiting to be assigned to available units. Unequal workloads between districts and between beats within districts often result from the existing geographic structure of patrol areas. Despite the department's efforts to analyze calls for service, the achievement of an equalized workload will be constrained by the existing patrol district configuration.

In addition to limiting effects of patrol district boundaries, police personnel are not currently assigned on a basis relative to demands for patrol services. The Budget Analyst reviewed personnel assignment in comparison to calls for service and hourly readings of "stacked calls" awaiting available units. The following table summarizes the results of this analysis on a city-wide basis.

<u>WATCH</u>	<u>%Personnel</u>	<u>%Radio Units</u>	<u>% Calls for Service</u>	<u>% Stacked Calls</u>
1st watch: 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. or 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.	28.7	29.4	27.6	22.3
2nd watch: 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.	35.7	36.8	29.4	5.6
3rd watch: 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. or 4 p.m. to 12 a.m.	35.6	33.8	43.0	62.1

As can be seen from the above, the assignment of personnel by watch does not correspond to the demand for service as measured by citizen initiated calls for service

and calls awaiting assignment to available units. There is excess coverage during daytime hours and insufficient coverage during evening hours. As a result, patrol units spend a greater proportion of their time responding to calls-for-service and a smaller proportion on preventive patrol during the evening. It is during the evening hours that a greater need for preventive patrol as a crime deterrent measure exists but the current assignment of personnel is directly contrary to that need.

The table presented above describes conditions on a city-wide basis. What is hidden in this level of summarization are even larger disparities existing within certain patrol districts and during time periods that do not correspond to the patrol watch.

Field supervision (the ratio of sergeants to patrol officers in the field at any given time) also varies widely, neither corresponding to the demand for service or to the actual number of personnel assigned. This is especially true on weekends when a greater proportion of sergeants are given time off relative to the workload and the need for supervision. During one 7-day period analyzed, there were 16 instances in which there was no sergeant assigned to the field for specific patrol districts and watches.

An example of the need for increased field supervision is the lack of control over the amount of time police officers currently spend on meal breaks. Police Station Procedure Rule 8.109 provides that an officer is entitled to a 1/2-hour meal to be taken during his/her 8-hour shift. The officer is also entitled to another 15 minutes if special circumstances dictate, e.g., restaurant crowded. In no event is the meal break to exceed 45 minutes. The crowded restaurant basis for extending the meal period should not occur every meal period, but only in exceptional circumstances. However, the SFPD has permitted all sworn officers to take a 45-minute paid meal break as a normal practice.

A sample of 488 SFPD dispatch records from September 5, 1977 to August 10, 1978, showed an average time of 54.4 minutes spent out of service for meal breaks. The 54 minute average meal break exceeds the allowed 30 minutes by 24 minutes. This 24 minutes represents 5% of a patrol officer's total watch. On a department-wide basis, this excess time spent out of service is equivalent to more than 50 police officer positions.

Patrol personnel assignments are controlled at two levels within the Police Department's Field Operations Bureau. The Deputy Chief in charge of Field Operations determines the number of personnel to be assigned on a district basis by allocating police officers in proportion to various measures of criminal activity and calls for service.

Once the determination of the number of personnel to be assigned on a district basis is made (performed monthly) the matter of assigning personnel on a watch basis (i.e. by time of day) is delegated to the District Captains. These assignments are apparently made without consideration of the demand for service and the need to equalize the workload in order to reduce waiting times during which patrol units are not available to respond to calls for service and provide for adequate preventive patrol time. Part of the problem is an apparent lack of information and analytical support to assist this decision making process resulting from the fact that the SFPD depends on manual processing of deployment data. Also, the demand for service does not correspond precisely to the eight-hour shift assignments and peak periods often overlap two patrol shifts during which there are different levels of assigned personnel.

Shift assignments are made on a seniority basis, with most experienced senior officers selecting the day shift as their preference. As was pointed out by the 1977 POST study, this results in relatively inexperienced officers providing patrol coverage

during high crime periods (evenings and nights). It was recommended that shift assignments be rotated on a 13-week basis in order to resolve this condition. No action has been taken on this recommendation to date.

The calculations of required patrol strength presented elsewhere in this report assume complete flexibility in the scheduling of watch off times and vacations. In reality, it is desirable to permit consecutive days off for obvious reasons relating to the morale of the police officers. Such scheduling would increase the number of sworn personnel required from the baseline number calculated. However, tighter management control with regard to the scheduling of days off would minimize the number of additional personnel needed. Another factor that increases the number of required patrol personnel is the need to dispatch multiple units to emergency calls. It is common practice for the Police Department to dispatch more than one car on priority 'A' calls except when responding to burglar alarms which, in 98% of the cases are false. (See our separate discussion in this report on the costs attendant to the false alarm problem. The remaining emergency or priority 'A' calls are judged to be situations in which safety precautions dictate the allocation of additional units.

One-person Patrol Units

Our calculations for a baseline patrol strength assume an increased utilization of one-person patrol cars from the current 9% to 30% of all radio car units. Arguments against the use of one-person patrol units are primarily based on safety reasons, citing the unpredictable and potentially dangerous situations officers often encounter. One-person patrol units have been demonstrated to be an effective and safe practice in other police jurisdictions, however.

The 1977 POST study of the SFPD recommended that maximum use of one-person patrol cars should be implemented within the context of remaining consistent with safety requirements and that two-person units should be used only wherever and whenever there is a demonstrated need. Although the Police Department states that these recommendations have been implemented, only 9% of the radio units were assigned a single officer during the sample period examined. Of this proportion of single person patrol units, over 90% were assigned during the day watch only. Most of these units were assigned in the Taraval District.

Two nearby police agencies, Oakland and San Jose, have implemented one-person patrol cars and achieved considerable improvements in patrol coverage as a result. These agencies, which were visited by Budget Analyst staff, have reported no negative effects resulting from this practice. San Francisco police officers have stated to our staff that the use of one-person patrol would require increased dispatching of back-up units for safety purposes thereby offsetting efficiencies that could be realized. However, since the dispatch of multiple units is already a common procedure in San Francisco for situations considered to be emergencies this argument is considerably weakened.

Special Events

In addition to the above cited factors affecting the number of police officers assigned to district stations, a variable number of officers is assigned on an as-needed basis for crowd and traffic control and security during special events such as museum exhibits, sports events, parades and demonstrations. The need for police personnel at such events is somewhat predictable and district stations are generally notified in advance that they will be required to detail a certain number of officers to these special

duties. In order to anticipate such demands, each district station must maintain a pool of back-up officers which can be made available for special duty. If this pool is composed of those officers who normally are assigned to neighborhood patrol, the result of special assignments is to reduce neighborhood patrol. Rather than assigning patrol officers to district stations and then detailing them to special duties, we would suggest maintaining a centralized pool of police officers, perhaps within the Crime Specific Task Force, which could be used for a wide variety of special assignments including the provision of police services at special events.

CRIME SPECIFIC TASK FORCE

The Crime Specific Task Force (CSTF) is a separate division within the Field Operations Bureau. Its responsibilities include crowd control, park security and specific anti-crime efforts. The Street Crimes Unit (within the CSTF) addresses the goal of combatting violent street crime with emphasis on street robberies, purse snatches and aggravated assaults. The officers assigned to this unit usually work in plain clothes and attempt to blend in with the general populace within high crime areas. Members of the Street Crimes Unit (SCU) employ street surveillance tactics and techniques such as "saturation" of high crime areas (predominantly the Tenderloin and Western Adition) and have experimented with decoy operations. The unit was formed in November, 1976 by the Chief of Police.

Preliminary evaluations of the effectiveness of the Crime Specific Task Force have generally been favorable. The studies have shown that within certain geographic 'target areas' (sections of the city that have demonstrated a higher than average incidence of violent street crime) and for certain types of crimes, the number of violent street crimes can be reduced by the commitment of personnel from the Street Crimes Unit. The unit's greatest advantage appears to stem from the use of highly trained police officers with greater flexibility than that afforded district patrol units. These personnel are able to be assigned to specific problem areas to deter specific crimes.

Other evaluations of the type of crime specific police activity conducted by San Francisco's CSTF have hypothesized the existence of crime "displacement". The suggestion is that crime is not prevented or controlled but merely displaced from the target area to another area of the city or to another city. SFPD evaluators have stated than there is no evidence of crime displacement within San Francisco resulting from decoy unit operations. They further hypothesize that perpetrators are more likely to be displaced to similar high crime areas within other cities instead of moving to dissimilar neighborhoods within San Francisco. Although this would be consistent with most modern theories of urban migration, insufficient information exists to reach a conclusion on the displacement of crime at this time.

Upon examining police department deployment records, Budget Analyst staff found that the ratio of felony bookings per officer was nearly three times greater for members of the CSTF than for officers assigned to routine patrol. This may be partly explained by the fact that members of the CSTF are assigned to selected areas where one would expect to encounter more street crime and thus have more opportunities to make arrests. Also, the number of personnel assigned to CSTF was found to be the only staffing variable that demonstrated a statistically significant association (a negative correlation) with the level of patrol preventable crime. Caution is necessary in the interpretation of these results as no basis exists for inferring causal relationships to what may in fact be nothing more than statistical anomalies. However, the preliminary data indicates that an expectation of favorable results from the assignment of a greater

number of officers to crime specific activity is well founded. Therefore, we are recommending an increase of 160 officers for the crime specific unit which would triple its current size. These additional officers could be assigned to a variety of duties including "saturation patrol" in high crime areas, the special event patrol referred to in the preceding section, public housing patrol and patrol in the MUNI tunnel under Market Street.

The addition of 160 additional sworn officers to the CSTF would still allow the SFPD to assume additional responsibilities within the authorized strength of 1,971 sworn officers. Possible additional responsibilities include the assumption of parking control, traffic control and City Hall security. These three possibilities are treated in separate sections of this report. Additional possibilities include an assumption of the MUNI security program now operated by limited tenure CETA employees and an expansion of training for new police officers to include firefighting training. With such training, these persons could serve in an expanded capacity as public safety officers, a new classification which would combine the duties of police and fire personnel. The cost of these new employees could be partially offset by savings in the Fire Department resulting from a deferment of hiring of new H2 entry level Firefighter positions.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of workload requirements for the SFPD Patrol Division suggests that the actual number of police personnel assigned to respond to calls for service exceeds the number necessary for the effective provision of services. This is partly due to the division of the City into 9 patrol districts and the attending personnel costs necessary to maintain such a structure. Additionally, the deployment of patrol personnel is less than optimal on both a geographic and temporal basis.

Encouraging preliminary results have been attained through the utilization of a specialized Street Crimes Unit within the SFPD's Crime Specific Task Force. The assignment of more police officers to this function with the expectation of achieving a greater crime deterrent capability appears warranted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- We recommend that the Board of Supervisors introduce and approve necessary legislation to permit the reduction of the number of district police stations pursuant to the requirements of charter section 3.530-1. The Police Department should then proceed to consolidate patrol districts in accord with our recommendations elsewhere in this report.
- The San Francisco Police Department should increase its efforts to assign patrol personnel on a geographic basis in a more rational manner.
- The Department should take immediate steps to assign personnel in proportion to the workload by watch and by day. Preliminary plans to stagger officer watch assignment such that patrol strength in the field more closely matches the workload by time of day should receive greater emphasis.
- Supervisory ratios of sergeants to patrol officers in the field should be instituted on a more equitable basis through increased management control of watch-off assignments. (The Deputy Chief, Field Operations has indicated

that efforts in this direction are already proceeding.)

- We reiterate the POST recommendation to increase the use of one-person patrol cars. All available evidence strongly suggests that this is an effective police practice that is generally accepted elsewhere and does not adversely affect the safety of police officers. Greater flexibility and increased coverage in the provision of preventive patrol services would result immediately.
- We recommend that 78 additional police officers be assigned to the MUNI security program to replace CETA employees when their tenure expires.
- We recommend that 160 additional police officers be assigned to the Crime Specific Task Force for the purpose of special deployment on an as-needed basis. Such special deployment could include such programs as MUNI security, public housing security, investigative patrol, or a public safety officer program.

BENEFIT

- Implementation of the above recommendations would provide an increased level of patrol services with fewer patrol personnel. An additional 160 police officers could be assigned to crime specific activities in accord with the stated goals of the Chief of Police. In addition, another 78 police officers could be assigned to the MUNI security program to replace CETA positions whose tenure will expire in 18 months.

CONSOLIDATING THE EXISTING NINE DISTRICT STATIONS INTO THREE PATROL STATIONS WILL IMPROVE POLICE SERVICES AND FREE 59 POLICE OFFICERS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO STATION DUTY FOR MORE ACTIVE PATROL ASSIGNMENTS.

In June, 1972 the San Francisco electorate voted overwhelmingly against the closing of two district police stations. The vote was 62,756 in favor of the station closings and 115,106 against the closings. The voter's handbook, prepared by the Registrar of Voters, contained no arguments favoring these closings. The arguments against closing district police stations centered around a fear that police presence in San Francisco neighborhoods would be reduced. Our analysis shows, on the contrary, that the existence of nine district police stations in San Francisco reduces effective police presence in San Francisco neighborhood below what would be possible if district stations were consolidated.

There are 9 district police stations in San Francisco. Approximately 900 police officers are assigned to these district stations. Of this total, 116 police officers (or 12.8%) are assigned to administrative responsibilities in the district stations. These officers are not assigned to patrol units in the field.

The need for district police stations has diminished because of the use of modern police radio communication and the modern police patrol system in which police radio cars are on the streets 24 hours a day. Through the use of radio-dispatched patrol cars, police officers can respond rapidly to calls for service. Most calls for police services do not come through the nine district police stations. More than 97% of the calls for police service are received by phone at the Hall of Justice. The dispatch unit at the hall of Justice then directly contacts patrol officers on the street. According to a survey by the City Planning Commission, less than one person per hour visits a SFPD district station. Most of these visits are related to traffic offenses.

The present stations are not designed for the efficient deployment of police patrol. Each station is too small to accommodate consolidation with other stations (see Attachment II which lists the location and use of police facilities). The existing district stations contribute to neighborhood traffic congestion. Northern Station is in a commercial district on Ellis Street. The site lacks parking space. Police vehicles add to the severe traffic congestion in the neighborhood and police officers must park their personal vehicles in the streets. Central Station on Vallejo Street occupies the first floor of a public parking garage. However, police cars have difficulty entering and exiting due to autos waiting to enter the garage. In the western part of San Francisco, Park, Ingleside and Richmond stations have sufficient parking space. Southeast, Mission and Taraval Stations have limited parking facilities.

The cost of maintaining 9 district stations includes the following:

- Personnel costs for 116 sworn personnel, to staff stations, totalling \$5,040,674 annually.
- Value of real estate (not on tax roll) which has a book value of \$1,219,000 (not including the Hall of Justice)

- Utilities (unnecessary energy use) and water, \$53,000 annually.
- Other indirect costs.

We concur with the State of California, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) 1977 Management Survey of SFPD district stations which reported as follows:

District Police Stations in Other Cities*

District stations should be established primarily to facilitate the deployment of field officers to their respective beat areas.

The concept of providing a police station for neighborhood convenience creates a manpower drain which is costly and unproductive. Police officers should be on the streets fighting crime and providing police service, not sitting in police stations.

*See Attachment III which compares San Francisco with other western cities regarding the number of district stations.

We also agree with the POST's recommendation to replace the nine district stations with three district stations strategically located to best serve all the people of San Francisco; one in the Northeastern part of the city, one in the Southwest, and one in the Southeast. The geographical area of patrol responsibility for the Northeastern station would cover what is now Central, Northern and Southern Districts, and the eastern portion of Park District. POST estimates that the police activity in those combined areas constitute approximately half of the total for the city and that the proposed Northeastern District Station should accommodate approximately 50% of the patrol force.

Each modern district station facility would provide:

- Offices for operations
- Lineup rooms for the briefing of ongoing shifts
- Conference Room
- Locker rooms and showers
- Gym
- Interview rooms and holding cells
- Auditorium
- Classrooms for training
- Utility and storage areas
- Restricted parking areas for change-of-watch vehicles.

POST recommended that the SFPD locate the second station in the western part of the city, covering an area which includes the western half of Park District and Richmond and Taraval Districts, which accounts for about 17% of the police activity occurring in the city. The district station should contain office space, two briefing lineup rooms, lockers and showers, a gym, and one or two classrooms for training. The third district station in the southeastern part of the city would be comprised of Mission, Southeast and Ingleside Districts and contain the necessary facilities as described for the other stations.

However, we disagree with the POST's recommendation that the city should construct three new facilities.

POST specifications for San Francisco district stations are as follows:

Northeast Station - Building, 20,000 square feet, plus land area of about 15,000 square feet for parking.

West Station - Building, 10,000 square feet, plus land area of about 8,000 square feet for parking.

South Station - Building, 14,000 square feet, plus land area of about 12,000 square feet for parking.

School District Sites

POST estimated the construction expenses of three new police stations, ignoring land costs, to total \$3 million. By moving the Traffic Division to Park Station and by decentralizing the parking control operation, SFPD would have adequate space and locker and shower facilities to have the principal patrol station the Northeast Station, at the Hall of Justice. The other two consolidated stations could be located at currently-vacant school sites at considerably lower cost than the cost of constructing new stations. The San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) has several vacant school sites available which are suitable for conversion into SFPD consolidated district stations.

Possible school sites, available space and the Budget Analyst's preliminary estimates of cost are as follows:

Police and School Zone	Estimated Usable Square Feet	Estimated Annual Rental	Capital Improvement to Convert to Zone Station
South Zone			
Fremont	24,400	\$100,000	\$400,000
Excelsior	19,000	126,000	500,000
Western Zone			
Columbus	16,000	67,200	600,000
Andrew Jackson	18,300	92,200	500,000

Proposed Organization for Patrol Division

POST proposed that the head of each of three districts report to the Deputy Chief for Field Operations. Supervising captains (commanders) would be in charge of the northeast and the south zone, with each watch covered by a captain. The west zone would have a captain assigned as division commander, with lieutenants as watch commander. Such a plan of around the clock supervision by police captains would improve the overall level of SFPD supervision. We agree with this proposed plan of organization and supervision.

Northeast Zone

The station serving the northeast part of the city would be located in the Hall of Justice. The zone would include what is now the:

Central District
Northern District
Southern District
Park District (east of Masonic Ave.)

Western Zone

The Western Zone station would be located at a vacant school site in the western part of the city. Logically the Western Zone would include the geographical areas of what is now the following SFPD districts:

Richmond District
Taraval District
Park District

Possible vacant school sites for the western zone include Columbus, and Andrew Jackson. The SFUSD would also consider the conversion of Mark Twain School, but that site is currently occupied. If school sites are found to be unsuitable, consideration could be given to construction of a new station on City-owned land adjoining the Park District station in the Kezar Stadium area. In 1977, the POST Commission estimated that cost of construction of such a station would be approximately \$700,000.

South Zone

Possible school sites for a South Zone station include Fremont and Excelsior. While the SFPD has under consideration the use of Fremont as a police academy, Fremont could be used as both academy and district station. Only 14,000 of the 24,400 square feet of usable space is needed for a district station at Fremont. The current capacity of the Police Department's training program is approximately 200 recruits per year. To achieve the required goals of the Officers for Justice settlement, the SFPD must train over 600 recruits in a two-year period during 1979 and 1980. If conversion of Fremont School to a consolidated district station were phased in after training needs return to normal, Fremont School has sufficient space for both the academy and the South Zone district station. Fremont School is surrounded by paved playground areas, that can be converted to secure parking for more than 100 autos. Fremont is close to the major freeway routes in the southern area of San Francisco.

In October 1978, the City Architect estimated that the project costs for alterations to the Fremont School in order that the facility may be used as a police academy total \$269,000 including \$80,000 for painting. Conversion to a district station would require additional locker and shower facilities, holding cells, and security screens. Consultations with the City Architect indicate that the project costs to convert Fremont School to a district station are approximately \$400,000. Since both usages have similar requirements for office space, meeting rooms, classrooms and locker and shower facilities, total project costs for alterations for joint usage as a district station and training facility would be in the range of \$500,000.

The proposed South Zone district station would consolidate the geographical areas of the following existing districts:

Southeast District
Ingleside District
Mission District

The estimated staff required at these 3 proposed district stations would be 110 including 57 police officers and 53 non-sworn personnel. The following table illustrates our proposed level of staffing with sworn officers.

<u>Sworn Personnel</u>	<u>Currently Assigned to Station Duty</u>	<u>Proposed Three District Stations</u>	<u>Net Difference</u>
Commanders	1	2	+1
Night Captains	2	0	-1
Captain	9	9	0
Lieutenant	35	25	-10
Sergeant	36	15	-21
Patrol Officer	33	6	-27
Total Sworn	<u>116</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>-59</u>

These sworn police officers would be supplemented by 53 non-sworn, primarily-clerical personnel.

Cost of Conversion

The cost of conversion-alterations for two school sites would be approximately \$1,000,000 and the annual rental to the school district would be \$150,000 - \$200,000. The book value of the eight district stations (not including Southern in the Hall of Justice) is \$1,219,000. Market values far exceed \$1.2 million. Selling 3 or 4 of the current district station sites for residential or commercial use should generate more than sufficient funds for necessary capital improvements to the school sites. The remaining surplus district stations sites could be sold or converted to other needed community uses. The net annual cost of consolidating the 9 district stations into 3 stations is \$100,000 - \$150,000 in annual rental costs. These costs would be eliminated if a current legal dispute between the City and the SFUSD over ownership of school property is settled in favor of the City. Also current utility costs would be reduced since the SFUSD rental amounts include utilities in some cases.

The Charter gives the Board of Supervisors the authority to approve any relocation or consolidation of the existing district stations. This Charter provision resulted from the vote by the electorate in 1972 in response to an attempt by the Police Department to close two district stations. The argument against closing these stations was that such closings would reduce police presence in San Francisco neighborhoods. However, our review of this issue shows that consolidating the existing district stations would actually increase the number of police officers that could be assigned to neighborhood patrol due to the reduced number of personnel required to staff the consolidated district stations. In addition, as already noted in our preceding finding, consolidation of existing district stations will permit a more efficient deployment of patrol personnel. The following section of this report illustrates how a more efficient deployment of patrol personnel can improve the response time to calls for police services.

CONCLUSION

Consolidation of the nine district stations into three district stations would greatly enhance the management of patrol functions. Conversion of two school sites and the Hall of Justice space for patrol station usage would provide sufficient lineup rooms lockers, showers, and gym facilities, which are badly needed for the officers and parking space for change-of-shift cars. The reduction in the number of district stations would improve

administrative control and increase police presence in San Francisco neighborhoods.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Police Commission and the Board of Supervisors, as required by the Charter, approve the closing of seven of the nine district police stations, the conversion of Park Station to Traffic Division headquarters and the establishment of two district stations at school sites for the Western and Southern Zones of San Francisco.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of this recommendation may require \$100,000 - \$150,000 in net additional expenditures for rent. However, consolidating the current 9 district stations into 3 stations would allow the transfer of 59 sworn personnel from unproductive station duty to an active presence on patrol beats throughout San Francisco.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RESPONSIVENESS
OF PATROL UNITS COULD BE ACHIEVED
WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF SWORN
PERSONNEL.

Emergency response time is a useful if not comprehensive proxy measure of patrol effectiveness. Its desirable properties are that it is easily measurable and understood by police experts and the general public alike. Response time is not solely determined by the number of patrol units in the field. It can be affected by operational and policy decisions. The Police Department has no established performance standard for responding to calls for service within a certain time.

Although often perceived as the amount of time a patrol unit requires to travel from its starting location to the scene of an incident, total response time is actually the amount of time elapsed between the receipt of a call for service by the police department and the time of arrival at the scene by a patrol unit. This process involves a radio dispatching procedure as well as the patrol unit's travel time. The dispatching process begins when a call is received by the police department. Information is provided to a complaint evaluator by a citizen and this message must be interpreted by the evaluator, reduced to written form (in a manual system such as San Francisco's) and transmitted to a dispatcher who, through radio communications, assigns the call to a field unit. It is at this point that the field unit commences its response to the call for service which is measured by the unit's travel time. The opportunities for errors in judgement and mistakes in the transmission of information are many throughout this process.

After drawing the first sample of dispatch complaint record (CR) slips, Budget Analyst staff noted that in general the time of a unit's arrival at the scene of an incident was not recorded. The time the call was received by the operator, time of dispatch of the patrol unit and the time at which the unit returned to service were, in most cases 'punched' on the CR slip by means of a time clock. It was therefore apparent that it would be difficult to analyze travel times in order to properly evaluate patrol responsiveness. Similarly, the POST research staff concluded that their allocation analysis could not be performed unless travel time data were available.

In January, 1979, an order was issued by the Deputy Chief of Field Operations directing all field units to report '10-97's (time of arrival at the scene of an incident) and for these times to be recorded on the CR slips. Although Budget Analyst staff had employed estimating procedures to include travel time analysis in this study, the desirability of acquiring actual travel time data was apparent. We decided to draw a second sample, the results of which are presented below.

Average Response Times By Call Priority

	<u>Priority 'A'*</u>	<u>Priority 'B' and 'C'*</u>	<u>All Calls for service</u>
(time expressed in minutes)			
<u>Dispatch time</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>15.2</u>	<u>10.6</u>
<u>Travel time</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.6</u>
<u>Total Response Time</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>16.2</u>

N=436

*In all but a few cases, CR slips were indistinguishable as to their assigned priority (A,B or C). In general, color coded slips (usually used to designate emergency calls) were judged to be priority 'A' while all non-color coded slips were regarded as routine calls (priority 'B' or 'C').

The two elements that make up total response time are the responsibility of separate organizational units within the San Francisco Police Department. The following analysis is divided into two sections: the dispatch function, which is the responsibility of the Communications Division under the Bureau of Support Services, and the travel time function which occurs in the Patrol Division of the Field Operations Bureau.

DISPATCH

The dispatch process begins when a call is received by a SFPD telephone operator. If the caller is requesting police assistance or attempting to report criminal activity, the call is routed to a complaint evaluator in the Automated Call Distribution System (ACDS). In some cases, when it is an apparent emergency situation, the operator assigns the call directly to a radio dispatcher who transmits the call on a city-wide basis to units in the field. ACDS evaluators determine the nature of the call, the caller's location (street address) and, through use of a manual system of location files, determine the appropriate patrol district and beat. This information is encoded on the CR slip which is then sent by way of a conveyer belt to the appropriate radio dispatcher. The dispatcher notes the nature of the call for service (i.e. whether it is an 'emergency' call or a 'routine' call) and either dispatches an available patrol unit or places the call in a queue to await an available unit if all radio units are busy. If a call is an emergency, such as a crime in process, multiple units are dispatched. If the 'beat car' responsible for the area in which the call for service was generated is busy on another call or out of service, another radio car from the same patrol district is dispatched. If all units in a patrol district are busy then the call is placed in a queue according to an established priority and must wait for an available unit to be assigned. If all units in a patrol district are busy and the call is of an emergency nature then the radio dispatcher must locate a field unit from another district that is available to respond.

In general, the completeness and legibility of information written on the CR slips is of very poor quality. Since these documents serve as a record of the activity involved, are often required as court evidence and provide source data for the types of analysis that should be conducted for patrol allocation decisions, this situation should be corrected. Dispatch priorities are in most cases not provided. The only distinguishing feature suggesting the call priority is the use of a salmon colored slip as an "attention getter" for the radio dispatcher. For sampling purposes, these CR slips were regarded as

emergency situations. Indications of priority 'B' or priority 'C' calls are uniformly absent. Although specific radio codes are assigned a predetermined priority there is a certain amount of variability built-in to the call priority structure that must be decided on by the dispatcher. Little indication of the dispatcher judgment that must be exercised is documented.

It is the objective of the dispatch unit to dispatch emergency calls (Priority 'A') as soon as possible, priority "B" calls within 10 minutes and priority 'C' calls within 30 minutes. Dispatch time data suggests that the priority 'B' and 'C' objectives are easily attained on average, but that some improvement could be achieved in priority 'A' calls. However, there is considerable evidence that many of the salmon colored CR slips that were indicated as emergency situations for sampling purposes were not in fact treated as emergencies, thus inflating dispatch times for such calls. For example, all audible and silent burglary alarm calls, of which 98% are false alarms, showed longer average dispatch time. If these calls were eliminated from the priority 'A' sample, average dispatch time would drop to 2.9 minutes and total response time, including travel time, would be 7.2 minutes. However, available data indicates that a total response time of 5 minutes in emergency situations is not unreasonable.

Since dispatch time goals for lower priority calls are being achieved, there is considerable evidence that different procedures in handling these calls would improve unit availability and response times for emergency calls. For example, if the lower priority calls were held for the respective 'beat' car then the availability of units for response to emergencies would be improved. At this time, units are dispatched to low priority calls whenever available within the patrol district. When this is done, the availability of units for emergency situations is reduced, having been diverted to a lower priority assignment.

When the call for service does not require the timely response of a field unit, report forms are mailed out to the requesting citizen to report the incident. The purpose of this procedure is to prevent the unnecessary assignment of a patrol unit. Although hard data is not available, there is some indication that this practice could be increased. (The Deputy Chief of Field Operations states that he is examining the use of mail-out forms with the intention of increasing their utilization and thereby effectively increasing patrol unit availability in the field. Examples of appropriate uses of the mail-out forms include such instances as citizens' requests for a police report that must be filed for insurance claims purposes, which are often times initiated substantially after the fact).

The poor quality of information encoded on the CR slips both increases the probability of dispatcher error and limits the analytical uses of the documentation. Training appears to be insufficient in this area, since only 4 fifty-minute classroom periods out of a total of 80 periods over a twenty day training cycle, are devoted to the completion of CR documentation. Also, except for the probationary (first 6 months) period of employment, employees are not evaluated for the completeness with which CR slips are filled out. After the first 6 months, dispatchers are evaluated according to standard Civil Service forms with no explicit reference to the complaint record documentation. The same procedures hold for the evaluation of dispatcher error. Such errors can significantly affect dispatch time and travel time when, for example, the wrong address of an incident is encoded and/or the wrong patrol unit is dispatched.

There is a need for the dispatch function to be closely linked operationally to the patrol function in a police department. The interactions are critical to minimizing response times and providing adequate documentation of field activities for purposes of analysis and patrol allocation.

Patrol

Many of the operational procedures discussed in the previous section on geographic and time-of-day deployment of patrol personnel also significantly affect the travel time required for a unit to respond to a call. Again, the equalization of workload among patrol districts and beats would improve the availability of patrol units, by decreasing the necessity to dispatch cars outside of their beats and reducing average travel time.

As was noted in the previous section on patrol deployment, stacked calls (those awaiting an available unit) should be considered a more important factor when allocation decisions are made. Also, it should be noted that the 'stacking reports' transmitted from dispatch to the Field Operations Bureau are not truly reflective of the actual queueing of calls for service. When hourly readings are taken for the stacking reports, all calls awaiting assignment are counted regardless of patrol unit availability. For analysis purposes, it is necessary that only calls awaiting assignment because of the unavailability of a patrol unit should be counted as a 'stacked' call.

Since cross-district dispatching only occurs when all units in a patrol district are busy, the size of the district bears a significant relationship to average travel times within that district. Analysis of the data indicates that this relationship holds true with the 9 patrol districts within San Francisco. While queueing of calls for service is theoretically thought to be a random process, it is in fact quite predictable by time of day and geographic area. This further supports the need to consolidate the patrol districts so that greater flexibility can be achieved in the dispatch of units. Until that is achieved, increased cross-district dispatching should occur during peak periods of the day to decrease average patrol unit travel time.

CONCLUSION

- While there are no generally accepted standards to evaluate the adequacy of response times, data indicates that the SFPD is achieving a reasonable level of performance in non-emergency situations. However, there are several opportunities for improvement in emergency situations that can be realized through operational changes and without the addition of sworn personnel. Many of these improvements would be realizable if the recommendations in the previous section on the deployment of patrol personnel are implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The SFPD should establish and monitor a performance standard requiring that police response time in emergency situations requires no more than 5 minutes.
- The SFPD should implement a policy of holding low priority calls for service until the beat unit is available to respond. This would result in improving the spatial distribution of available units and decrease the queueing of high priority calls that require faster response times for effective crime apprehension and public safety.
- Increased supervision, training and employee evaluation should be implemented in order to improve the level of documentation provided on complaint record forms. This would result in decreased dispatcher error and

provide better information for field units and more reliable data for analysis and patrol allocation decisions.

- Current efforts to increase the utilization of mail-out report forms should be continued.
- Data collection of the number of 'stacked calls' should be improved; reduction of queueing of calls should be a criterion for patrol allocation.
- The Dispatch function of the Communications Division (Bureau of Support Services) should be placed under the direct management control of the Deputy Chief in charge of the Field Operations Bureau. This would permit improved coordination between the two key elements of emergency response capability. The accountability of the dispatch function would be placed under the division of the SFPD most affected by its performance. Improved control of the quality of information provided to the patrol allocation decision process would result.
- The current patrol district structure should be consolidated as recommended in the previous section of this report.
- Equalization of patrol workload among radio car beats should become a primary goal of the SFPD. Increased cross-district dispatching should be applied during peak periods of the day.

BENEFIT

The implementation of these recommendations would improve the response time of the Police Department in emergency situations by 2.7 minutes or 35% of the current response time in such situations.

THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE
DEPARTMENT HAS EXCESSIVE NUMBER
OF POLICE OFFICERS WHO ARE ON
DISABILITY LEAVE DUE TO ACCIDENTS
AND INJURIES.

At any given time, there are approximately 100 San Francisco police officers who are not available for duty because of injuries. This level of disabilities is approximately 6.2% of the total uniformed force and is significantly greater than the level of disabilities experienced by other major Bay Area police departments. For example, the disability rate in the Oakland police department is approximately 4% and the disability rate in the San Jose police department is approximately 2%.

Lack of Physical Fitness Standards

There is a clear pattern of disabling injuries to San Francisco police officers. More than half of those police officers on disability leave have experienced injuries to the back or knee. Problems with the heart and the ankle are the next most common reason for disability among police officers.

In spite of a recognizable pattern in injuries which lead to disability leave, the Police Department does not have an established physical fitness standard which must be met by all police officers. A minimal test is required for police officers who joined the force after 1970, but this test does not emphasize fitness of the back, knee, heart or ankle. If a police officer fails to pass this minimal physical standard or to meet the weight standard of the Department, a disciplinary hearing before the Police Commission is required. However, the Police Commission does not use these hearings to enforce the fitness standard and the current weight standard allows for a 10% deviation which has been automatically allowed. The Chief of Police submitted a revised standard to the Police Commission on March 13, 1978 which is in the meet and confer process with the Police Officers Association.

Police recruit training in San Francisco includes extensive physical fitness training. During the 18-week police training academy, 96 hours (the equivalent of 2.4 weeks) is devoted to physical training. Performance standards are established which emphasize general conditioning (heart, legs), strength and flexibility. Tests are given at the end of the 3rd week of training and again at the end of the 6th week of training. These tests are designed to demonstrate whether a recruit is able to begin the more strenuous self-defense and police baton training which is given during the last 12 weeks of the training academy. However, according to the officer in charge of the physical training program, failure to pass these tests does not disqualify a recruit from further participation in the training program.

Of the approximately 100 police officers on disability leave in January, 1979, approximately 40% had participated in the physical fitness training program required in the police academy. (Those who had not participated in this program had joined the Department before the program was begun.) Of those who had participated in the physical training program, 14 or approximately 25% were identified by the departmental training officer as being deficient in physical fitness at the time of the completion of their training. This group of 14 police officers has accumulated a total of 1,104 days of disability leave.

Economic Incentives to Take Disability Leave

There are significant economic incentives for a police officer to take a disability leave if such a leave is available. Disability benefits include payment of full salary. However, these benefits are not taxable and therefore the actual income for a police officer on disability leave is greater than the income for a working police officer of equal rank.

The level of disability pay is established by State law under the Labor Code. The tax-free nature of disability payments is established by Internal Revenue Service policy. Therefore, the amount of compensation paid to a police officer on disability leave cannot be reduced through a change in City policy without a corresponding change in State and Federal policy.

CONCLUSION

A combination of a lack of adequate physical standards and the existence of economic incentives which make disability pay higher than normal pay contribute to what is an excessive disability rate among San Francisco police officers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- We recommend that the Police Department develop physical standards for all police officers. These standards should be related to common disabilities experienced by police officers such as injuries to the back, knee, and ankle and should also stress general conditioning in order to reduce heart problems. Along with these standards, the Department should adopt a goal of a 50% reduction in disability leaves by police officers.
- We further recommend that the Police Commission adopt the weight standards recommended by the Chief of Police on March 13, 1978.

BENEFITS

Implementation of this recommendation and a reduction in police officer disabilities by 50% would provide the equivalent of an additional 50 police officers who could be assigned to police work. Improved physical fitness will enhance the police officers' ability to perform in the field.

REPLACEMENT OF NON-SWORN PARKING CONTROL OFFICERS BY SWORN POLICE OFFICERS AND A DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE GOALS FOR PARKING CONTROL COULD INCREASE POLICE PRESENCE, INCREASE REVENUE TO THE GENERAL FUND BY AN ESTIMATED \$6 MILLION ANNUALLY AND REDUCE COSTS BY AN ESTIMATED \$2.5 MILLION ANNUALLY.

Enforcing parking regulations is primarily the responsibility of the Traffic Division. The Traffic Division assigns parking control officers to cover 82 separate "beats," residential parking areas in North Beach and the Glen Park neighborhood, street cleaning routes, Golden Gate Park, and tow away zones along major traffic arteries. In the 1978-79 fiscal year, there are 155 parking control positions authorized for the Police Department. Of these positions, 29 positions were specifically approved as new positions for traffic control work in the newly-created residential parking area (Area A) in North Beach. The cost of these parking control personnel is approximately \$2.5 million annually. Parking control positions are non-sworn; Parking Control Officers do not have police powers.

A few Parking Control Officers are assigned to the district stations (1 or 2 per district) for the purpose of enforcing violations which are reported to those stations. The remaining positions are based at the Hall of Justice. Approximately three-quarters of the parking controllers work Monday through Friday. The remainder work Tuesday through Saturday.

Because Parking Control Officers are not police officers, they have limited powers. They cannot make arrests, conduct investigations or perform any of the other functions of police officers. This limited function is unfortunate in that parking control personnel are some of the most visible in terms of police presence and yet their lack of police powers prevents their presence from acting as an effective deterrent on crime. Many of the established parking control beats are concentrated in the high crime areas of the City. Given the commitment of the City to substantially increase the number of sworn police officers during the next 10 years, and given the Police Chief's stated goal to increase police presence in high-crime neighborhoods, the assignment of police officers to parking control duties as a part of their regular police function would substantially increase the police presence in strategic neighborhoods in the City and would facilitate a rapid response to requests for assistance in those neighborhoods.

As it currently operates, the parking control operation produces substantial revenues for the City. In 1977-78, fines paid for parking violations amounted to approximately \$11 million. In 1978-79, the revenue from parking fines is expected to total approximately \$12 million. The addition of the parking control function to the duties of police officers would not reduce these revenues because the addition of parking control responsibilities to police duties would be accompanied by an addition of police personnel. In fact, if the new personnel were provided with appropriate performance standards and goals, revenues from the parking control operation could be increased substantially.

During the 1978-79 budget hearings, the total number of parking control positions needed to adequately enforce parking regulations in San Francisco was a controversial

subject. Personnel from the Traffic Bureau maintained that even with the addition of the 29 positions requested to cover Area A, there would be insufficient personnel to cover all the existing parking control beats.

In order to make an independent estimate of the number of Parking Control Officers that are required to enforce parking regulations in San Francisco, we reviewed the number of citations issued by all parking control personnel, followed Parking Control Officers as they covered their beats and simulated parking control in a sample of 22 of the 82 parking control beats. This review revealed that:

- The number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer during an 8-hour shift averaged 66.8 but varied from a high 222 to a low of 7.
- Complete coverage of 17 of the 22 simulated beats could be completed in 45 minutes or less. (The simulation time included the time required to stop and write citations.)
- The number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer in Area A averaged approximately 53% of the number of parking citations issued per Parking Control Officer in all other areas of the City.
- Parking Controllers working on Saturdays issue an average of 40% more citations than Parking Control Officers working on other days of the week.
- Approximately twice as many parking citations are issued per hour per Parking Control Officer between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. as are issued during the hours of 7 am. - 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. - 6 p.m.

The results of our review indicate a need for performance standards for parking controllers. Such standards could be stated in terms of goals rather than quotas and could cover the number of citations to be issued each hour of an 8-hour shift as well as the total number of citations which should be expected to be issued over an 8-hour shift. These standards could be used to evaluate not only the performance of parking controllers, but also the appropriate size of parking control beats and appropriate times to cover those beats. For example, our review indicates that in general, parking control beats are too small. Greater area can be assigned to each parking controller without sacrificing the adequacy of coverage. Also, the results of our review indicate that large numbers of parking violations do not occur early in the morning. Use of a performance standard which focuses on the time that citations are issued as well as on the number of citations issued could help the Police Department to assign parking controllers to their beats during the hours of greatest need.

The results of our review also indicate a need for more parking controllers on Saturdays. The small number of parking controllers currently assigned on Saturdays have a relatively high productivity in terms of numbers of citations issued. However, this small number of persons cannot adequately patrol all of the parking control beats in the City as evidenced by the large number of parking violations which can be observed any Saturday at various points throughout San Francisco.

Greater coverage on Saturdays could be achieved without additional numbers of personnel by utilizing the parking controllers who would become available through enlarging existing parking control beats. A more even coverage on all days could be achieved by adopting a work schedule for some parking controllers which does not include consecutive days off. By establishing work schedules which pair Sunday with Tuesday,

Wednesday, Thursday or Friday as days off, an equal coverage for all six work days could be achieved. Such a situation would be preferable to the current schedule where Mondays and Saturdays are inadequately covered and the Tuesday through Friday period has excessive coverage. Changing work schedules to provide non consecutive days off is permitted under Sec. II.A.3 (F) of the Salary Standardization Ordinance. However, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Police Commission and the Police Officers Association provides for at least two consecutive days off.

The results of our review also suggest a need for decentralizing the parking control operation. Parking control beats are scattered throughout the City. Centralizing parking control at the Hall of Justice means that parking controllers who work on the west side of the City spend a substantial portion of their shift commuting from the hall of Justice to their beat. If parking controllers reported to a police station that was in closer proximity to their beats, time which is now non-productive in terms of parking control could be made productive. If police officers assumed the parking control function, then parking control could be decentralized to the district stations.

CONCLUSION

Assumption of the parking control function by police officers and the implementation of performance goals and standards for parking control would increase police presence in San Francisco neighborhoods, increase the capacity of the Police Department to respond to calls for police services, increase revenues from parking control, and reduce Police Department costs by approximately \$2.5 million annually.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Police Department take the following actions with regard to the parking control operation:

- Replace all non-sworn parking control personnel with sworn police officers.
- Establish performance goals for all parking controllers and use these goals to evaluate personnel performance, size of parking control beats and appropriate times for beat coverage. We would suggest that a goal of approximately 100 citations per parking controller per 8-hour shift would be appropriate based on existing performance levels. Such a performance goal would still allow police officers working in this capacity sufficient time to respond to emergencies, provide assistance on request and participate in crime prevention activities as appropriate.
- Increase the number of parking controllers assigned to Saturdays either through negotiating a change in the Memorandum of Understanding regarding consecutive days off or else by rotating shift assignments.

SAVINGS/BENEFIT

The implementation of these recommendations would increase police presence throughout San Francisco, improve enforcement of parking violations, generate additional revenues of approximately \$6 million annually for the General Fund of the City and County, and reduce Police Department costs by approximately \$2.5 million annually. The costs of processing parking citation payments, which is performed by the accounting section of the Municipal Court,

would increase by an estimated \$1.5 million. However, the Municipal Court is currently developing a new procedure for processing parking citations which would substantially reduce these costs. Therefore we estimate that the net benefit to the City from implementation of these recommendations would be approximately \$8 million annually.

**REPLACING TRAFFIC CONTROL
OFFICERS WITH POLICE OFFICERS
WOULD INCREASE POLICE PRESENCE IN
THE CONGESTED DOWNTOWN AREA AND
WOULD PRODUCE SAVINGS OF OVER
\$300,000 ANNUALLY.**

The Police Department has 19 authorized Traffic Control Officer positions. Personnel in these positions are assigned to busy intersections in the congested downtown area in order to facilitate the flow of traffic.

Traffic Control Officers do not have police powers, are not armed and cannot make arrests. They do have the authority to issue moving citations. However, since they are on foot, they generally have to call in a police officer to stop a traffic offender and return the offender to the scene of the violation in order to be cited by the Traffic Control Officer. Few such citations are issued.

During the morning and evening commute hours, traffic controllers demonstrably facilitate the movement of traffic in and out of San Francisco. During the middle part of the day, however, there is less traffic and less congestion and the need for traffic controllers is not as vital. If police officers were assigned to traffic control duties during the commute hours, they could also be assigned to foot patrol beats in the downtown area during non-commute hours.

The Police Chief has stated that he intends to increase the number of foot patrol officers in the downtown area and also saturate such high crime areas as the Tenderloin with uniformed police officers. Most of the traffic control sites are in close proximity to either high crime areas such as the Tenderloin and South of Market or downtown commercial districts which have also been suggested as appropriate to receive additional foot patrol officers. Thus, the use of police officers as traffic controllers during peak commute hours and as foot patrol officers during non-commute hours would increase police presence in precisely the areas which have been designated as areas needing greater police protection. In their dual capacity, police officer/traffic controllers could respond to emergencies with full police powers at any time and could perform regular patrol and investigative functions during non-commute hours.

The current cost of 19 Traffic Control Officer positions is over \$300,000 annually including salary and fringe benefits. This entire sum could be saved if the traffic control function were taken over by sworn police officers.

CONCLUSION

Assumption of the traffic control function by sworn police officers would increase police presence in congested downtown areas, would permit increased foot patrol in these areas during non-commute hours, would facilitate response to calls for police services in high crime areas such as the Tenderloin and South of Market and would save over \$300,000 annually.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Police Department assign the traffic control function to sworn police officers and that the 19 Traffic Control Officers authorized for the Police Department be deleted.

SAVING/BENEFIT

Implementation of this recommendation will increase police presence in the congested downtown area, facilitate the response to calls for police services in the Tenderloin and South of Market areas and save over \$300,000 annually.

PROVIDING PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS TO IMPROVE CITY HALL SECURITY WOULD REQUIRE AN EXPENDITURE OF \$515,000 ANNUALLY. CONSIDERING THE SETTLEMENT REQUIREMENT THAT SAN FRANCISCO MAINTAIN 1,971 SWORN POLICE PERSONNEL, THE SFPD WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO ASSIGN 22 POLICE OFFICERS TO CITY HALL SECURITY AT NO ADDITIONAL COST.

Feeling that the recent tragic events required a thorough review of City Hall security provisions, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) established an interdepartmental security committee including security experts from Pacific Telephone and Pacific Gas and Electric Company. The committee reviewed all aspects of the security situation in City Hall and made recommendations to the CAO. The recommendations fall into three categories: building improvements, security equipment, and security personnel. The costs involved in these three categories are as follows:

Building improvements (onetime expenditure)	\$70,000
Security equipment (onetime expenditure)	85,000
Security personnel (annual cost)	515,000

The CAO's security committee has estimated that to provide proper full time security, including nights and weekends, requires one full-time supervisor and 22 security guards. According to the CAO's cost data, 22 private security guards and a supervisor would cost \$515,000 compared to 22 police officers (Q2) costing \$750,000. If one assumes that these Q2 police officers are at the new retirement rates the cost drops to \$658,061 for 22 Q2's.

Rather than hire private security guards or police officers to provide City Hall security, the CAO has proposed, after consultations with the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors, that CETA employees be used for this purpose. The CETA regulations restrict maximum salaries to \$12,800 annually and maximum tenure to 18 months. We question whether the use of transitory employees can provide adequate security at City Hall.

The City has recently adopted a policy calling for a level of 1,971 police officers in the Police Department. Our review of patrol and other police functions indicates that this number of police officers would be sufficient to substantially increase police services in San Francisco and also to staff 22 police officer positions at City Hall. Use of sworn police officers would provide more effective security at City Hall than private security guards and they will inspire greater confidence in City Hall security by the public.

CONCLUSION

Considering that the City has agreed to staff the SFPD at the level of 1,971 sworn officers, there are sufficient police officers to staff a security detail at City Hall. Therefore, hiring private guards is not needed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board of Supervisors should not approve the hiring of private security guards for City Hall security but instead should request that the SFPD provide 22 sworn officers for City Hall security.

SAVINGS/BENEFIT

Implementation of this recommendation would save the annual expenditure of \$515,000 for private guards. In addition, the level of security should be higher than the level which would be achieved by use of private security guards.

THE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAS ASSIGNED CLERICAL DUTIES TO STATION OFFICER AND POLICE SERVICE AIDE POSITIONS WORKING AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE AND AT DISTRICT STATIONS. THESE DUTIES COULD BE PERFORMED BY CLERICAL PERSONNEL AT A SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS.

The Police Department has 33 authorized Police Service Aide positions and 12 Station Officer positions. The compensation for these positions is identical at \$21,437 annually including salary and fringe benefits. The Station Officer positions date from the time that the Police Department operated the City Prison in the Hall of Justice. These positions worked in the prison. Now that the Sheriff has taken over the operation of City Prison, the Station Officer positions have been assigned to other duties, primarily within the district stations.

In the 1978-79 budget, 33 Station Officer positions were converted to a new classification of Police Service Aide. This conversion did not provide any increase in salary but broadened the scope of duties which can be performed by this classification compared to the duties of a Station Officer. It was intended that these new Police Service Aide positions would perform routine duties outside of the district stations which are now performed by Police Officers and thus release Police Officers for other, more complex and demanding duties. However, a lack of clerical positions in the district stations (these positions were requested but not approved in the 1978-79 budget) has resulted in the assignment of Police Service Aides to station duty.

The duties of the Station Officers and the Police Service Aides are almost entirely clerical. In the district stations, the Police Service Aides monitor the police radio, maintain the police log (the record book for the station), and compile reports for the Captains and Lieutenants. In the Hall of Justice, Station Officers work with clerical personnel performing such duties as filing, answering the phone and typing.

Clerical personnel in the Police Department have complained that this situation is inequitable. They have taken their complaint to the Civil Service staff. The Civil Service staff investigated the complaint and found that the contention that Station Officers are performing largely a clerical function in the Police Department is correct. Our review of this issue found that the Police Service Aides are also performing what is basically a clerical function. However, the classification description for both the Station Officer and Police Service Aide positions states that clerical duties may be assigned.

Police Department personnel state that clerical duties must be assigned to Station Officers and Police Service Aides because there is no one else to perform these duties. They point to a severe shortage of clerical personnel in the Police Department and state that the alternative to using Station Officers and Police Service Aides as clerks is to assign clerical duties to Police Officers. Our review of this situation revealed that in many cases, Police Officers are performing clerical functions now.

The shortage of clerical personnel in the Police Department is the result of several factors. Part of the problem is the salary freeze which went into effect as a result of the passage of Proposition 13. This freeze prevented pay raises of 11.5% for all City clerical personnel from taking effect. Since wages for clerical personnel are based on clerical wages in other Bay Area municipalities and in the private sector, this wage

freeze has presumably placed San Francisco at a competitive disadvantage in recruiting clerical personnel.

A further difficulty for the Police Department in recruiting clerical personnel is the requirement that all incoming clerical personnel accept night work. The Police Department has a number of 24-hour operations which need clerical staff. Even with the premium paid for night work, this work is generally considered to be less desirable than day work. Consequently, the Police Department often finds that it is in a competitive disadvantage with other City departments because of its assignment policies. (The Civil Service staff and the Police Department have agreed on a procedure which will allow the Department to survey all the clerical lists to determine whether there are sufficient persons on those lists who will accept night work. This procedure should facilitate the filling of clerical vacancies in the Police Department.)

In addition to the problems of low salaries relative to the private sector and undesirable working hours relative to other City departments, the Police Department's effort to recruit clerical personnel appears to suffer from a problem of attitude. We received testimony that two applicants for positions at Police Department district stations who were referred by the Department's own personnel office were told that no openings were available at these stations. Whether this rejection was based on sexual discrimination or on a general hostility towards non-sworn personnel working in district stations or on some other basis is not known. However, if the Department expects to successfully recruit clerical personnel it must develop a receptive attitude to such personnel. Reportedly, district stations have now been directed to accept clerical applicants.

This situation is demoralizing to clerical personnel as is evidenced by testimony given to us during the course of our audit and by a petition submitted to the Civil Service staff. The use of Station Officers and Police Service Aides to perform clerical duties is also quite costly. The difference between the annual compensation including salary and fringe benefits for a Station Officer/Police Service Aide and various clerical positions is illustrated in the following table.

<u>Position</u>	<u>Compensation</u>
Station Officer/Police Service Aide	\$21,437
Senior Clerk Stenographer	\$14,895
Clerk Stenographer	\$13,953
Senior Clerk Typist	\$13,890
Clerk Typist	\$12,727

If the 45 Station Officer/Police Service Aide positions were replaced by clerical positions, annual savings in salary and fringe benefits would be as follows:

<u>If Replaced By</u>	<u>Annual Savings</u>
Senior Clerk Stenographer	\$294,383
Clerk Stenographer	\$336,794
Senior Clerk Typist	\$339,620
Clerk Typist	\$421,955

CONCLUSION

Work assigned to Station Officer and Police Service Aide positions would be more appropriately assigned to clerical personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Police Department delete the Station Officer and Police Service Aide classifications and replace them with appropriate clerical personnel both in the Hall of Justice and in the district stations.

SAVINGS/BENEFIT

The implementation of this recommendation would raise the morale of clerical personnel working in the Police Department and would also produce a savings of at least \$300,000 annually.

THE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAS TOO
MANY VEHICLES AND MAKES
INADEQUATE USE OF THOSE VEHICLES.

The Police Department owns and operates its own vehicle fleet. As of September, 1978, the fleet consisted of the following vehicles.

<u>Autos</u>		<u>Trucks, Vans, Cycles</u>	
Marked cars	183	Trucks and patrol vans	26
Unmarked cars	204	3-wheel motorcycles	148
Driver training	6	2-wheel motorcycles	62
Total autos	<u>393</u>	Trail bikes	18
		Motorscooters	13
		Total other vehicles	<u>267</u>

Police Department personnel repeatedly express dissatisfaction with police vehicles. They complain that vehicles are not available when needed and that the condition of police vehicles is poor. These complaints are heard at all levels of the Department.

The number of police vehicles per sworn officer has been steadily increasing. According to the City Purchaser, over the past five years the Police Department has replaced 225 cars and added 76 cars to its vehicle fleet. Over the same period of time, the authorized sworn strength of the Police Department has dropped from 1,958 officers to 1,852 officers and the current number of filled positions is approximately 1,620 officers. Thus, while the number of vehicles owned by the Department has been increasing, the number of sworn personnel has been decreasing.

We reviewed vehicle use in the Police Department by examining mileage records and by observing the amount of time that vehicles were in use. We found that 45 unmarked police vehicles are driven an average of less than 500 miles per month (less than 6,000 miles per year). Of this group, 13 cars were driven 300 miles per month or less which is less than 3,600 miles per year. Marked police vehicles are used 24 hours per day and therefore tend to be relatively high mileage vehicles compared to unmarked police cars which are used primarily during the day. However, we found that 26 of the Department's marked cars are driven less than 1,000 miles per month which means that during an average eight-hour shift these vehicles are being driven less than 12 total miles. From our patrol observation we determined that an average patrol car will travel approximately 33 miles when in use during an 8-hour shift. Therefore, it would appear that these low-mileage marked cars are idle for much of the time.

Given that mileage data indicate an under-utilization of police vehicles, we reviewed the actual incidence of vehicle use at district stations and the Hall of Justice. (Most marked cars are assigned to the district stations whereas most of the unmarked cars are assigned to units which operate out of the Hall of Justice). This review revealed that police vehicles are frequently idle. For example, a count of police vehicles parked in the Hall of Justice garage at various times over a six-day period showed that an average of 94 unmarked and 13 marked cars were idle. This finding is consistent with our observation throughout our management audit that the police garage, which has a capacity of 120 cars, appears to be at least half full at virtually any hour of the day.

Fewer idle cars were noted at the district stations. We did note, however, that each district station attempts to keep at least one back-up vehicle in case one of their primary cars malfunctions. This procedure of keeping vehicles in reserve at the district station level means that marked police vehicles may be kept out of service in one district at the same time that another district is experiencing a vehicle shortage.

Another source of idle police vehicles at the district station level results from assigning cars to what are known as "dog units". A dog unit consists of a patrol officer and a dog who work together on an 8-hour shift. Officers who are not assigned to dog units complain that the odor in the dog unit vehicles is extremely unpleasant. Consequently, dog units are assigned vehicles which are not used by any other officers which means that these vehicles are idle two shifts per day when the dog units are on patrol and for the entire day when the dog units are off. Currently there are 5 dog cars which are located at 4 different stations.

Our review of vehicle utilization revealed that there is a severe parking shortage at most district stations and in the Hall of Justice garage. In the Hall of Justice garage, cars are frequently parked in the aisles which makes it difficult for other vehicles to enter and leave. Due to these crowded conditions, the Police Department has reserved curb lanes on either side of the Hall of Justice for police vehicles. This use of curb lanes reduces the available parking in what is already a congested area and also is a potential security problem in that the personnel who work in the Hall of Justice garage have no visual contact with the police vehicles which are parked outside of the garage.

The parking shortage is also evident at many of the district stations. This shortage is compounded by the fact that at many stations patrol officers return approximately 1 hour before their shift ends in order to write their daily reports. This practice creates unnecessary congestion in and around the district stations while at the same time it reduces police presence on patrol beats.

The existence of idle police vehicles is inconsistent with the frequent complaints of vehicle shortages that are heard from police personnel. This inconsistency can be explained by the way in which the Police Department allocates vehicles. Rather than operating one central pool of vehicles, the Police Department operates a number of separate "mini-pools". Each district station is allocated a certain number of vehicles which stay at that station. At the Hall of Justice, vehicles are assigned to various units and individuals. These vehicles are not available to other individuals or units in the Department even if they stand idle for much of the day. Since these "mini-pools" of vehicles often contain only 7 or 8 cars, leaving 1 or 2 cars idle may not seem like a major waste of departmental resources. However, when the idle time for cars within these mini-pools is multiplied by the number of mini-pools in the Department, the result shows a substantial underutilization of police vehicles, especially unmarked vehicles.

CONCLUSION

The Police Department underutilizes its vehicle fleet and could substantially reduce the number of police vehicles with no decrease in vehicle availability through a change in the allocation of these vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Police Department take the following actions with regard to the use of police vehicles:

- Centralize all unmarked police cars in one vehicle pool which is controlled by personnel in the Hall of Justice garage.
- Place a moratorium on the purchase of new police vehicles and eliminate 50 unmarked police cars from the vehicle fleet.
- Either eliminate the dog units or centralize them at one station on different watches with one vehicle assigned to them.
- Centralize all back-up marked police cars at the Hall of Justice garage and allocate them on an as-needed basis to the various stations and units.
- Require that patrol officers write their field reports outside of the district stations and minimize the time that marked police cars spend at district stations through a general order covering patrol practices.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of these recommendations will increase patrol presence in San Francisco neighborhoods, reduce congestion in and around police stations and the Hall of Justice, increase vehicle availability to all police units, reduce vehicle maintenance and repair costs by approximately \$50,000 annually due to a decreased number of police vehicles, and provide a one-time saving of approximately \$400,000 based on deferring the purchase of approximately 50 additional police vehicles in the coming year.

THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR PROGRAM FOR POLICE VEHICLES IS INADEQUATE AND COSTLY AND CONTRIBUTES TO AN UNDERUTILIZATION OF POLICE VEHICLES.

Operation of the police vehicle fleet is under the authority of the Deputy Chief of Support Services. Maintenance and repair of police vehicles is performed by the City's Central Shops. Funds to pay for maintenance and repair of these vehicles are transferred from the Police Department budget to the Central Shops (Purchaser) budget. In the 1978-79 fiscal year, \$821,681 is included in the Police Department budget for maintenance and repair of vehicles.

During the 1978-79 budget hearings, the Police Department Deputy Chief of Support Services voiced strong criticism of the Central Shops operation regarding repair and maintenance of police vehicles. Complaints concerned primarily the high cost of repairs and the lack of information provided by Central Shops to the Police Department on the actual repairs performed, parts replaced, labor costs and total repair costs on specific repair items.

The Budget Analyst investigated these complaints and found them accurate. (See our forthcoming management audit of the City's Central Shops and Vehicle Fleet Management for recommendations on these and other matters relating to a more efficient operation of City vehicles.) We also found evidence that the Police Department's own vehicle management practices are inadequate, however. Specifically, we found that:

- 9% to 14% of the police vehicle fleet is out of service at any given time.
- The accident rate for police vehicles is high. During the 1977-78 fiscal year, 31% of marked police vehicles and 15% of unmarked police vehicles were involved in accidents.
- Maintenance and repair records are not kept in Police vehicles. As a result, it is difficult for the drivers of the vehicles and for the Central Shops mechanics to determine when routine maintenance should be performed. Consequently, such items as brakes are frequently replaced because they have not received proper maintenance.
- Vehicles are not routinely reassigned in order to assure uniform utilization and mileage. Instead, vehicles are assigned to specific district stations or to specific units which then operate their own "mini-pool" of vehicles. As a result, some vehicles accumulate extremely high mileage (16 cars in the police vehicle fleet have accumulated mileages of over 95,000 miles each) while other vehicles are driven less than 3,600 miles per year (we found 12 vehicles in this category).
- Vehicles which are taken out of service for repairs are often left sitting for several days both before the repair work is performed and after the repair work is completed. We found that of the vehicles receiving service by Central Shops at the Hall of Justice service station, 12% were ready for more than two days before they were picked up by Police Department personnel.

- Vehicles which receive major repairs are subsequently sold for a price which is substantially less than the cost of repairs. We reviewed the maintenance and repair charges on each police vehicle and found that during 1977-78, 51 vehicles had maintenance and repair charges against them averaging \$1,446. Of these vehicles, nine vehicles with maintenance and repair charges averaging \$1,374 were subsequently sold. The average price received was less than \$100.
- Regular inspections of Police vehicles are not routinely performed. Therefore, responsibility for damage is difficult to determine in many cases.
- The Police Department does not have a fleet manager with responsibility for all police vehicles. In the 1978-79 budget, a position of fleet manager was specifically authorized for the Police Department. This position remains unfilled due to delays in the civil service classification procedure.

CONCLUSION

The Police Department does not have an adequate program for operating police vehicles and for monitoring the maintenance and repair of those vehicles. These deficiencies contribute to high percentage of police vehicles which are out of service at any given time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the San Francisco Police Department take the following actions with respect to the management of the police vehicle fleet.

- Fill the vacant fleet manager position.
- Establish a policy whereby police vehicles are periodically reassigned so as to provide for uniform use.
- Maintain in each vehicle a maintenance and repair history file indicating all repairs by description, cost, time spent and parts replaced. This file should also specify a regular preventive maintenance schedule and should provide a mechanism for verifying that the prescribed maintenance schedule is followed.
- Establish a policy whereby all drivers inspect their vehicles at the beginning and end of each shift and document all malfunctions and all body damage.
- Identify vehicles which are scheduled for replacement and specify that such identified vehicles not receive major repair and maintenance work.
- Establish a procedure whereby, subject to safety considerations, functioning vehicles are not taken out of service for repairs unless the necessary parts are in stock and until the Central Shops mechanics have time available to work on the vehicles.
- Establish a policy whereby all police vehicles are picked up from the Central Shops garage within four hours of the time when work on those vehicles is completed.

- Establish a goal of reducing the accident rate by 50%.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

- Implementation of these recommendations will provide for better utilization and maintenance of the police vehicle fleet at a saving of at least \$37,000 annually as shown below:

Police Vehicle Maintenance Savings

50% reduction in accident rate	\$25,000*
Not repairing vehicles scheduled for replacement	12,000*
Regular preventive maintenance	Unknown
Total	<u>\$37,000*</u>

*Based on costs from the 1976-77 and 1977-78 fiscal years.

RECORDS, SECURITY AND CONTROL PROCEDURES ARE INADEQUATE IN THE PROPERTY CONTROL SECTION OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND STORAGE FACILITIES AND PACKAGING PRACTICES IN THE CRIME LAB ARE DEFICIENT.

Field Procedures for Booking Property Evidence

The SFPD Patrol Officers Manual (POM) given to all police officers contains procedures for the correct packaging, labelling and registering of property for identification. All such property must be the subject of an Incident Report and if not brought directly to the Hall of Justice must be recorded in the property control log book which each district station maintains. Size permitting, all evidence must be sealed in a SFPD Property Envelope.

The POM requires that money be packaged separately from other evidence and be described carefully (see Attachment IV). Handguns are packaged separately and narcotics are specially packaged in an "Analyzed Evidence" envelope, sealed with wax, and brought directly to the narcotics lock box or the Criminalistics Lab located on the 4th floor of the Hall of Justice.

The Support Services Bureau has the principal responsibility for SFPD property, evidence and supplies. Two divisions of the Support Services Bureau carry out this function: the Criminalistics Lab and the Property Control Section.

Property Control Section

As of May 1978, there were 12 persons assigned to the Property Control Section: 1 lieutenant, 5 police officers, and 6 civilian positions (including a clerk and a typewriter repair person). Using open-face metal shelves and steel file cabinets SFPD property control staff store all evidence property in the Property Control Section except narcotics and other lab analyzed items and stolen autos which are handled by the Bureau of Inspectors. Property control staff store cash and small items of high value in a walk-in safe adjacent to the lieutenant's office. Based on property clerk records, we estimate that over \$1.2 million worth of property is handled by the Property Control Section annually and that over \$150,000 in cash is on hand in the Property Control Section at any given time.

Property control personnel make one regularly scheduled property run daily, Monday through Friday, to pick up property at the district stations. Once brought to the Property Control Section, property control staff make an entry in the Log book titled "Record of Property" which includes date of seizure, name and assignment of booking officer and a description of the property. The property identification number is the page and line of the log book. Upon final disposition of the property, staff make the appropriate entry in the log book such as "destroyed" or "released" or "disposal by sale". For release, the Investigations Bureau inspector involved in the case must complete a "property release report" signed by the inspector, owner and property clerk. A separate release records log book is maintained in the property Control Section, containing the signed numbered release forms.

Crime Lab

The Crime Lab receives and stores narcotics and breathalyzer samples, and analyzes such evidence. The crime lab has 15 sworn and 16 non-sworn positions assigned to it. The sworn positions function primarily in the field where they collect evidence and conduct investigations. Twelve of the non-sworn personnel receive and store the evidence and conduct chemical and physical analyses as appropriate. The remaining 4 positions (2 clerks, a lab assistant and a station officer) have less responsible positions.

Procedures

Our review of the Property Control Section and Crime Lab included interviews, observation and comparisons of the record systems to the property evidence physically present.

Our review of the Property Control Section revealed that:

- 33% of a sample of 106 envelopes containing cash could not be located. After a week of thorough searching and review of the property log books, Police Department personnel still could not locate 23 envelopes (22% of the total) from our original sample. The total missing cash from our audit sample was \$2,847. The 23 missing evidence envelopes were reported to contain 41% of the cash in the total sample of 106 envelopes. A sample of valuable non-cash property such as televisions and stereophonic equipment reviewed at a later date was entirely accounted for but this equipment was stored on open shelves, in old cardboard boxes, on the floor and in aisles.
- A separate record of cash evidence was not maintained . SFPD personnel did not know how much cash was in the Property Control room.
- The SFPD Property Control Section lacks internal control through separation of duties and independent review. Release forms are not prenumbered and the same personnel who record the entry of property maintain the release documents and handle the preparation for auction. The SFPD Accounting Section played no role in establishing record procedures nor auditing the accuracy of records.
- The Property Control Section does not have a written procedures manual. Though a draft manual was started, employees lacked guidance in many areas. Several problems were observed: a) Staff have no written rule governing which items belong in the safe; some staff understood that cash amounts over \$200 belong in the safe but many items over \$200 were not in the safe. b) Fireworks were stored in the safe along with more than \$70,000 in cash and other valuables. (SFPD staff moved fireworks to a cold locker after we questioned the suitability of storing explosives with cash.); c) There are no written procedures on who can open envelopes and reseal envelopes; d) Several envelopes were torn or opened and in one case, in the safe, property was kept in a large brown bag which was ripped open in two places.
- Generally, SFPD patrol officers do not follow the Patrol Officers Manual procedures in carefully describing cash evidence on the outside of the Property Envelope; few envelopes had both a written and numerical description of cash, such as (\$10) ten dollars.

Discussion of our findings with the Property Control Section lieutenant and the Deputy Chief of the Support Services Bureau led to a further audit by the Police Department and the opening of a criminal investigation. Security procedures were tightened by changing the combination to the safe, limiting the number of employees who know the combination to the safe and transferring all cash evidence received prior to 1978 into the safe. We do not believe that these steps are adequate to remedy the problems that our review uncovered.

Our review of the Crime Lab revealed that overall procedures of record keeping and control are adequate. However, we observed the following deficiencies:

- There is insufficient secure storage space for bulk controlled substances such as marijuana. Marijuana was found stored in ripped bags and open packages.
- Six employees in the Crime Lab have keys to the locked narcotics storage lockers.

CONCLUSIONS

- The Property Control Section has inadequate records, security and control procedures for holding and processing the over \$100,000 in cash and \$1.2 million in property which is handled annually by that section.
- The procedures and controls in use in the Crime Lab are basically sound but more storage space, better packaging of bulk substances and fewer narcotics locker keys are needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the following actions be taken:

- Replace the 5 police officers in the Property Control Section with civilian employees and redeploy the police officers to more productive police work. The sworn officers perform the same work as non-sworn personnel and have no demonstrated advantage in the areas of storekeeping, recordkeeping, and control of property.
- Provide prenumbered release documents to the Bureau of Inspectors. To obtain the release of property, after the appropriate signatures, the inspector assigned to a particular case can give the Property Control Section a copy of this release form which can be maintained as the property control record.
- Direct the Accounting Section to assist the Property Control Section in implementing internal control and record procedures and to conduct periodic, routine small-scale sample audits of the Property Section.
- Update the draft procedures manual, corrected for audit deficiencies, in order to provide clear written procedures for property control personnel.
- Insure that patrol officers are given proper supervision so that items in property envelopes are correctly described on the outside of the envelopes. Cash should be thoroughly described. SFPD patrol sergeants should review the property booking work.

- Divide the combination of the safe between pairs of employees so that no single employee knows the entire combination.
- Provide the Crime Lab with more locker storage space for controlled substances by providing metal shelves or bins within the existing secure storage rooms.
- Use packaging materials for bulky items: plastic bags, industrial paper bags, boxes, etc. All narcotics evidence should be entirely sealed.
- Restrict keys and direct access to narcotics storage areas to the Criminologist and his 2 supervisors.

BENEFITS

Implementation of these recommendations will have the following benefits:

- Improved management in the Property Control Section and the Crime Lab will reduce the opportunity for theft and will facilitate the effective processing and storage of cash, property and controlled substances with a total value in excess of \$1.3 million.
- Replacement of the sworn officers in the Property Control Section will release these personnel for duties which are more related to their training as police officers.

REVENUES RECEIVED FOR SPECIAL SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT COVER LESS THAN 31% OF THE COST OF THESE SERVICES IN SPITE OF CHARTER REQUIREMENTS AND CHARGE RATES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE RECOVERY OF COSTS. AS A RESULT, THE CITY LOSES \$1.36 MILLION ANNUALLY.

Revenues for special services provided by the Police Department come from a variety of sources including permits, special events, sports events and motion picture filming. In addition, the Police Department provides some special services for which no fees are charged. Revenues received for the provision of these services in 1977-78 totaled approximately \$555,000 whereas the cost of providing these special services was approximately \$1,848,000.

Permits and Licenses

The Charter requires that fees for licenses and permits at least cover all costs of regulation and inspection (see Attachment V, Charter Sections 6.402 and 7.704). In fiscal year 1977-78, SFPD permit revenues were \$29,988. The projected 1979-80 Permit Section budget is \$138,407 but this sum does not include the full cost of regulation and inspection. Other SFPD permit costs are for the administration, background investigations and interviews and review of records as specified in the permit ordinances. An estimated 6 full time equivalent police officers (Q2), at an estimated cost of \$216,072 annually, work in the district stations performing background and complaint investigations and interviews for new applicants and existing permit holders. The time of 1.5 inspectors of the Vice Crimes Division at a cost of \$62,652 annually is devoted to the regulation of massage parlors, primarily conducting background investigations of maseuse/maseur applicants for permits. The Pawnshop Detail and Security Unit requires 6 inspectors and 2/3 of the time of a lieutenant at a cost of \$282,380 for the inspection of pawnshops and special permit - required pawnshop records, junk dealers and second hand merchants. We have calculated that SFPD administrative overhead costs involved in the permit function are 32.7% of direct cost, resulting in an additional \$228,740 in costs. Thus, total SFPD permit related costs are \$928,251 compared with permit revenues of \$29,988. Funds received by the Tax Collector for licenses regulated by the SFPD further offset SFPD costs by approximately \$250,000 annually. Therefore, the net deficiency in revenue received for these SFPD services is approximately \$650,000 annually.

False Alarms

The Budget Analyst staff reviewed a sample of 2,739 calls-for-service (cfs) from a total sample of over 5,000 records reviewed at the SFPD communications center. Responding to alarms, Code 100 A (audible) and S (silent), represents 9.6% (263 of 2,739) of the total number of cfs. The Police Department has calculated that 98% of requests for police services initiated by alarm are false alarms.

The rate of false alarms in San Francisco is similar to the rate of false alarms in other western municipalities such as the following: Los Angeles County - 97% false alarms, Seattle - 97% false alarms, and San Jose - 98.2% false alarms. The Los Angeles, Seattle and Pasadena police departments report declines of 67.5%, 23% (within 12 months), and 60% respectively in false alarms through programs that require alarm permits and fines or service charges.

Based on our sample of SFPD responses to alarm cfs, we estimate that patrol officers time, worth more than \$280,000 on an annual basis, is spent directly on responding to false alarms. Considering the high cost of false alarms, a program to control false alarms and charge businesses the full costs of the SFPD's response to alarms appears reasonable. A permit for alarm systems could be \$50 initially and \$25 thereafter for annual renewal. Those alarms lacking permits or having excessive false alarms annually, for example more than 5, should be subject to a warning, fines, and then disconnection from the SFPD communications center.

To recover the cost of SFPD responses to false alarms, a service charge or citation to \$15 could be charged each time a SFPD patrol officer responds to an alarm. This would include valid alarms since response to an actual robbery or burglary would produce benefits far in excess of \$15. Estimated revenue from 20,000 annual alarms at \$15 each would be \$300,000 annually which is approximately the cost of patrol time consumed directly in alarm cfs work.

Special Events

The San Francisco Administrative Code (Sec. 10.B.2) provides that persons or firms with the approval of the Chief of Police can hire SFPD officers for law enforcement purposes. This section of the Administrative Code specifies that amounts for services be computed at straight time rates plus 91% for administrative overhead. The San Francisco Giants and various motion picture firms have hired SFPD officers for security purposes. In addition, the Police Department assigns extra patrol officers to regulate traffic on the days of major sports events in the areas affected by those events.

The present rate structure, 122.5% of direct labor, does not nearly reflect the costs to the City and County of San Francisco of providing sworn police officers. We calculate that actual administrative overhead is 64.1% of direct labor for a patrol-security function. Also when paid on an hourly or daily basis, direct labor rates should include an allowance for vacation, holidays and sick leave. Therefore, to reflect actual costs, the SFPD should charge 191% of straight time police officer rates for traffic, patrol, and security police work.

Currently, professional sporting events do not require police permits. Requiring that all professional sports events affecting policing conditions in San Francisco have a permit would allow the SFPD to charge the full costs, estimated at \$280,856 based on the level of special police services for races, football and baseball games provided during 1978-79.

Filming

Movie filming often obstructs and encroaches on public streets and places which requires the hiring of police officers to regulate traffic. Movie companies hire police officers at straight time rates plus 22.5% for this work. A professional filming permit and the charging of full SFPD costs at straight time plus 91% for overhead would have produced an additional revenue of \$81,067 in 1977-78 for police-movie services.

CONCLUSION

The SFPD and the City have not charged the full cost of special police services including permit regulation and inspection and security at special events.

RECOMMENDATIONS


We recommend that the Board of Supervisors take the following actions:

- Amend the fee structure of the permits and licenses regulated by the SFPD (see Attachment VI for specific fee recommendations).
- Adopt an alarm permit ordinance, requiring a \$15 fee for each response to an alarm.
- Amend Section 10B.2 of the Administrative Code to read straight time plus 91% for overhead.
- Adopt new permit ordinances for special events, major professional sporting events, major races requiring entrance fees and motion picture filming which make extraordinary demands on police services. Such enterprises should pay for the full cost of such special services.


SAVINGS/BENEFITS

- Increased SFPD permit and license revenue would be approximately \$650,000 as required by the Charter.
- Reducing false alarms would improve overall provision of police services and police officer safety. Permit and service charge revenues would amount to approximately \$300,000.
- Charging full administrative and fringe benefit overhead (91%) would result in \$81,000 more from movie companies and \$39,000 from the Giants based on the amount of police time hired in previous years.
- Charging for special event permits for sports and film events would produce at least \$240,000 in additional revenues.
- Total recommended additional fees and charges for special services provided by the SFPD are \$1,360,000.

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION CHART



**SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
EXISTING POLICE FACILITIES AND LOCATIONS**



CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - 1973

• DISTRICT STATIONS

- A. Central 766 Vallejo St.
(Corner Emery Lane)
- B. Southern 850 Bryant St.
- C. Southeast 2300 Third St.
- D. Mission 1240 Valencia St.
- E. Northern 841 Ellis St.
- F. Park Stanyan and Waller Sts.
(Golden Gate Park)
- G. Richmond 461 Sixth Ave.
- H. Ingleside Balboa Park at
Sgt. John Young Lane
- I. Taraval 2349 - 24th Ave.

▲ OTHER FACILITIES

- 1. Police Headquarters
 - 2. Youth Services Bureau
 - 3. Helicopter Unit
 - 4. Park and Beach Unit
 - 5. Mounted Unit
 - 6. Pistol Range and K9 Training
 - 7. Candlestick Park Police Tower and Substation
 - 8. Police Communications Tower
- Hall of Justice, 850 Bryant St.
2475 Greenwich St.
Crissy Field, Presidio
Park Station, Golden Gate Park
Polo Field, Golden Gate Park
John Muir Dr. & Lake Merced Blvd.
Candlestick Park
Christmas Tree Point, Twin Peaks

POST 1977 STUDY

DISTRICT POLICE STATIONS

For large cities in Western United States

CITY	Total City Square Miles	Number of District Police Stations	Average Square Miles in District	Population	Population Density per Square Mile
San Francisco	46.38	9	5.15	666,100	14,361
Denver	117.5	5	23.5	523,700	4,473
Long Beach	49	1	49	340,900	6,957
Los Angeles	466.2	17	26.5	2,739,100	5,857
Oakland	63	1	63	333,100	5,300
Portland	95	3	31.66	382,000	4,008
San Jose	157	1	157	577,700	3,680
Seattle	83.64	3	28	507,000	6,062
Vancouver, B.C.	44	2	22	440,000	10,000
San Diego	319	3	106	773,400	2,424


DATE	STA. OFF	SUSPECT 1	CHARGE
MON 10/01/73	JARAYA	STICK M. UPP	ALL PC.
ARRESTING OFFICER(S)	GEORGE GORDON # 999	SUSPECT 2	CHARGE
	SHANE SWIFTFOOT # 222		

PROPERTY FOR I.D. (CONTENTS)


One (1) Twenty Dollar Bill = \$ 20.00
 One (1) Ten Dollar Bill = \$ 10.00
 Four (4) One Dollar Bills = \$ 4.00
 TOTAL = \$ 34.00

Thirty Four and no Dollars

- A. Completely describe money in denominations and amounts. Describe total amount numerically and verbally.



DATE BOOKED LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE INITIAL COUNTS NO PERSONAL PR



- B. Place marked money in the "money" envelope.



- C. Place "money" envelope in Property Envelope. See Figure #5 for the proper method to seal the Property Envelope.

Charter of the City and County of San Francisco

6.402 Fees for Licenses and Permits

The fees or licenses to be charged under ordinances referred to in section 7.704 shall not be less than the cost to the city and county of regulation and inspection provided, that in so far as the regulation and inspection of foodstuffs or articles of food for human consumption are concerned, the fees or licenses to be charged for such regulation and inspection shall be as determined by the board of supervisors, but the same shall not exceed the cost of said regulation and inspection.

7.704 Permits and Licenses

The board of supervisors shall regulate, by ordinance, the issuance and revocation of licenses and permits for the use of, obstruction of or encroachment on public streets and places, exclusive of the granting of franchises governed by other provisions of this charter; and for the operation of businesses or privileges which affect the health, fire-prevention, fire-fighting, crime, policing, welfare or zoning conditions of or in the city and county, and for such other matters as the board of supervisors may deem advisable.

Such ordinance shall fix the fees or licenses to be charged. Said ordinance shall also specify which department shall make the necessary investigations and inspections and issue or deny and may revoke the permits and licenses therefor.

Permits and licenses shall be issued by the departments as designated by ordinance, only after formal application for such permit or license.

If any application for a permit or license is denied by the department authorized to issue same, the applicant may appeal to the board of permit appeals.

Charter of the City and County of San Francisco

3.537 Special Powers of the Chief of Police

... The chief of police may refuse to issue any permit that is subject to police department investigation and issuance, if it shall appear that the character of the business or the applicant requesting such permit does not warrant the issuance thereof, or he may revoke any such permit as soon as it shall appear that the business or calling of the person to whom it was granted is conducted in a disorderly or improper manner, or that the place in which the business is conducted or maintained is not a proper or suitable place in which to conduct or maintain such business or calling.

The chief of police in the performance of police duties shall have power to examine at any time the books and the premises of pawn-brokers, peddlers, junk and second-hand dealers, auctioneers and other businesses designated by the board of supervisors, and for these purposes shall have the power of inquiry, investigation and subpoena, as provided by this charter.

SEC. 26. Facts to Be Considered by Departments. In the granting or denying of any permit, or the revoking or the refusing to revoke any permit, the granting or revoking power may take into consideration the effect of the proposed business or calling upon surrounding property and upon its residents, and inhabitants thereof; and in granting or denying said permit, or revoking or refusing to revoke a permit, may exercise its sound discretion as to whether said permit should be granted, transferred, denied or revoked.

ATTACHMENT VI

page 1 of 2

SFPD Fee Schedule

We offer the following permit and license fee structure as a preliminary estimate of the magnitude of fee increases necessary to cover all SFPD costs. We recommend that the SFPD review our cost estimates and fee recommendations. As the administrative agency responsible, the SFPD must evaluate whether the current level of regulation and inspection and its associated expense are necessary. We recommend that the SFPD, after reviewing our data, develop a detailed permit and license structure and draft the necessary legislation.

Code Section		Est. Permits Number	Lincense No.	Current Fee		Recommended Fee		Estimated Revenue		Total Revenue
				Permit	License	Permit	License	Permit	License	
108 MC 1.3	Bingo Games - Annual (new permit)	18	150	25	0	50	50	2,000	8,000	10,000
	Amend			5	0	25	0			
	Special	40		25	0	50	0			
1023	Circus	2	2	0	125	500	500	1,000	1,000	2,000
1124	Driver of Public Vehicle (taxi)	200	200	15	100	15	100	3,000	20,000	23,000
MC 128	Operator of Public Vehicle (taxi)	1,000	0	0	0	100	-	100,000	-	100,000
2701	Massage - Establishment	305	-	15	-	100	100	30,000	30,000	60,000
2700	- Service/Out-call	20	-	50	-	700	-	14,000	-	14,000
2737	- Masseur/Masseuse	10	140*	10	-	75	50	5,250	7,000	12,250
	- Trainee	175	350**	10	-	75	50	13,125	17,500	30,625
1320.1	Mobile Caterer - New	5	-	50	-	100	100	500	30,000	30,500
	- Additional Stops	300	-	-	-	100	-	30,000	-	30,000
1320.11	- Assistant	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-
	- Transfer	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-
1279	Pawnshop*	1	28	25	480	1,000	1,000	1,000	28,000	29,000
MC119	Junk Dealer	1	12	25	115	1,000	1,000	1,000	25,000	26,000
MC 1.7 1279.1	Second Hand Dealer - - Furniture, Clothing, etc.	150	913	10	10	150	150	22,500	130,000	159,450
1237	- Auto Accessories	10	-	10	10	150	150	1,500	-	1,500
869	Peddler - Owner	100	-	0	0	30	20	3,000	NA	3,000
	- Employee	100	-	0	0	30	20	3,000	NA	3,000
1060.1	Place of Entertainment	40	75	25	28	100	50	4,000	3,750	7,750
	Tear Gas	120	-	6	-	50	-	6,000	-	6,000
790	Theater	20	-	25	-	110	-	2,200	-	2,200
3000	Tow Car Operator	20	-	5	-	100	-	2,000	-	2,000
MC 1.72	Retail Dealer in Fire Arms	9	22	30	164	200	200	1,800	1,400	6,200
MC 303	Mechanical Arms. Device	150	2,400	0	50	100	50	15,000	108,000	123,000
42	Loud Speaker/Vehicle	NA -	NA -	-	-	-	-	20	-	NA
827	Car Park Solicitor	35	-	2	-	100	50	3,500	NA	3,500
1070.1	Cabaret	32	90	25	-	100	50	3,200	NA	3,200
1246	Auctioneer	10	30	10	250	100	250	1,000	7,500	8,500
										811,475

*MC is Municipal Code

**Est. Two years of permit holders

*We have not recommended that pawnshops pay a fee and license structure equal to full cost of \$282,380, but rather only 10% of cost as it can be argued that investigation of pawnshop records is normal police work.

Bibliography

Larson, Richard C., Urban Police Patrol Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

Larson, Richard C., "What Happened to Patrol Operations in Kansas City? A Review of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment", Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, 1975.

Olson, Officer Bert, "Patrol Unit Allocation Analysis" (for Line Police Districts) (DRAFT) SFPD, Planning and Research Division, April 1978 - (not officially adopted or released)

Chaiken, Jan M. "Transfer of Emergency Service Deployment Models to Operating Agencies", Management Science, March 1978.

Kelling, G.L. "Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment", Police Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1974.

Thierauf, Robert J., Decision Making Through Operations Research, New York, 1975.

The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), State of California, San Francisco Police Department, Management Survey, 1977.

Department of Justice, State of California, Crime and Delinquency in California, 1977, Sacramento California, 1978.

Gay, William G., Improving Patrol Productivity Volume I, Routine Patrol, LEAA, July 1977.

Levy, Ruth J., "Predicting Police Failures", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.58, 1967.

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1976, Washington D.C., 1977.

Institute for Local Self Government, Alternatives to Traditional Public Safety Delivery Systems, Berkeley, California, 1977.

Cahill, Thomas J., Chief of Police, SFPD, 1968 Special Report San Francisco Police Department, January 1968.

The San Francisco Committee on Crime, A Report on the San Francisco Police Department, Parts I and II, June 1971.

Ahern, Francis J. Chief of Police, A Study of the San Francisco Police Department, December, 1957.

Eastman, George D.(editor), International City Management Association (ICMA), Municipal Police Administration, Washington D.C., 1969.

Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, Annual Report, 1977.

Grassie, Richard P. and Crowe, Timothy D., Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program, LEAA, February 1978.

Heaphy, John F. Police Practises, the General Administrative Survey, the Police Foundation, Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, 1978.

Needle, Jerome A., The National Project to Develop Police Program Performance Measures - American Justice Institute, A Selected Review of Contemporary Literature, and Annotated Bibliography (LEAA Grant), Sacramento, California.

Baccari, Alessandro and Associates, A report to the Officers and Members of the San Francisco Police Officers Association, August, 1971.

Hatry, Harry P. How Effective Are Your Community Services? Procedures for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Municipal Services, the Urban Institute and the, ICMA, Washington D.C., 1977.

Schack, Stephen, Improving Patrol Productivity Volume II Specialized Patrol, LEAA, July 1977.

Chaiken, J., Hypercube Queuing Model: Executive Summary, The New York City Rand Institute, R-1688/I-HUD, July 1975, 17 pages.

Chaiken, J., Patrol Allocation Methodology for Police Departments, The New York City-Rand Institute, R-1852-HUD, September.

Chaiken, J., and P. Dormont, Patrol Car Allocation Model: Executive Summary, The New York City-Rand Institute, R-1786/I-HUD/DOJ, September 1975.

Chaiken, J., and P. Dormont, Patrol Car Allocation Model: User's Manual, The New York City-Rand Institute, R-1786/3-HUD/DOJ, September 1975.

Chaiken, J., E. Ignall, and W. Walker, A Training Course in Deployment of Emergency Services: Instructor's Manual, The New York City-Rand Institute, R-1784/I-HUD, September 1975. A Training Course in Deployment of Emergency Services: Student's Manual, R-1784/2-HUD, September 1975.

RESPONSE FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

(Note: The page references contained in the Police Department response are based on page numbers in a prior draft of the Budget Analyst's report. Because of modifications in the final report, some of these page references are not exact.)

RESPONSE FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

PREFACE

The purpose of our response is to address certain findings, conclusions and recommendations in the Report. If our response does not address a finding, conclusion or point made, it should be concluded that we do not disagree and will implement the recommendation made. The method used will be to follow the Report's table of contents and to discuss each section in sequence. References to the Report will be made by a parenthetical inclusion in our response to the pertinent page number of the Report.

Heretofore we have acknowledged that the Police Department has a multitude of operational problems resulting in undue costs, inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. We have endeavored continuously to address those problems with inadequate resources and time to do so in the most expeditious manner. Therefore, we welcomed the Budget Analyst's review and will benefit from it by realizing improved police services and conditions.

We were in continual consultation with the Budget Analyst's staff during their review and the development of the Report; we are appreciative of the fair-minded approach that characterized their dedicated effort.

INTRODUCTION

The Report concludes (page 4) that 1677 sworn personnel are sufficient to provide police services to the citizens of San Francisco. We will show that such a number of sworn personnel is not enough to police the City even if every assumption upon which the figure of 1677 depends is fulfilled. Quite simply, the Report does not consider some functions being performed which should be performed and sets the needed strength of some units at their current actual strength, even though the units have been reduced because of current manpower shortages.

The Report recommends (page 5) a distribution of personnel (based on a total complement of 1971 sworn personnel) which eliminates 220 non-sworn positions and provides that functions currently performed by certain non-sworn personnel be performed by sworn officers. Although the recommendation may make sense in purely fiscal terms, our response will demonstrate that the recommended distribution of sworn personnel will result in little, if any, impact on crime other than by the display of an increased number of uniformed police throughout the City. It is only by freeing police officers from routine and quasi-police functions and directing their activities against specific crime problems that we can hope to have an effect on crime.

FIRST FINDING

Deployment of Patrol Officers

"Significant improvement can be realized in the deployment of patrol personnel. A more effective level of patrol services could be provided by assigning additional police officers to specialized police units which can be deployed to meet particular objectives."

A main point made in the introduction (page 4) is that "our independent analysis indicated that if the SFPD were restructured and reorganized, the approximate number of sworn positions needed would be 1,677..." A table follows which details how the Budget Analyst would distribute sworn positions in the police department.

Recommended Distribution of Sworn Positions in the SFPD

District Patrol - Street Duty (Radio Cars)	476
District Patrol - Station Duty	57
District Patrol - Special Duty	158
Crime Specific Task Force	240
Traffic Patrol	142*
Administration, Hall of Justice	100
Bureau of Inspectors	325*
Disability	50
Training	120
Muni Security	10
Total Sworn Officers	1677

* Current authorized level. These sections of the SFPD will be reviewed in Part II of our management audit.

To fully comprehend the recommended number of 1,677 positions, it must first be understood, as the Budget Analyst has pointed out, that the number is based on several assumptions which oftentimes depend on the implementation of other recommendations made in the Report:

1. That we continue with, complete, and expand our conversion program now under way.
2. That the nine district stations be consolidated into three.
3. That the rate of officers on disability be reduced by half.
4. That increased use of one-officer radio cars be implemented.

Notwithstanding the assumptions upon which the figure of 1,677 is constructed, we cannot agree, based on the supporting data provided, that such a number of police officers is adequate to provide police services to the City.

The table recommends that 476 officers be provided to perform called-for service activities (responding to citizen's calls for service in marked radio cars). That number is further broken down in the text (page 8) to be made up of 407 Q2 police officers and 69 supervising

sergeants. The number of 407 police officers to provide needed response to called-for services depends on the assumption that 30% of all vehicles responding to called-for services will be one-officer units with no increase in the number of units. It is axiomatic that if a police agency converts from two-officer to one-officer units, the number of units must be increased to provide cover cars in potentially hazardous situations. (This concept will be further developed in responding to the section of the Report dealing with one-officer cars.)

The table then shows 57 officers of all ranks needed to perform supervisory and operational duties within consolidated district stations. Assuming station consolidation, we have no problem with that figure. Next, the table shows 158 positions of all ranks to perform all other patrol duties now performed by police officers in district stations and shows an expansion of the Crime Specific Task Force from 80 to 240 personnel (an increase of 160 personnel).

The text which supports the need for 158 positions of all ranks to perform all other non-called-for service functions in the Patrol Division is found on pages 9 and 10 of the Report. In summary, the Analyst states, by way of reducing the number of officers presently required to perform the functions shown:

1. That we need 16 police officers to provide the wagon service now being performed by 41 officers if we consolidate wagon service.
2. That we can assign the work of 30 full-time equivalent police officers now performing traffic-related duties (e.g. driveway and colored zone violations) in district stations to other units of the police department, thus reducing the net number of employees required by 30.

The Budget Analyst's recommended figure assumes also that the number of officers assigned, during their period of analysis, to non-called-for service type activities (e.g. school patrol) is sufficient to perform the specified functions to an adequate level even though we have reduced the personnel assigned to some functions of the Department because we are well below our current authorized strength.

With regard to patrol wagon consolidation, the Report states that we are in the process of consolidating the arrest booking procedure in the western portion of the City. That consolidation is based on a detailed analysis of the number of persons arrested by time of day and day of week by location, to assure that transportation capacities and booking facility capacities will not be overloaded. Next, we intend to consolidate the arrest booking function in the Central, Northern and Southern Districts. A consolidated arrest and booking process will reduce the number of patrol wagons needed, however, the total number (five wagons per day) as recommended is much too low. The recommendation provides for a patrol wagon on duty for two watches in one of the consolidated districts, three watches in another, and none in the third. In effect, the Report (page 9) states that no wagon service is needed for the area now covered by the Central, Northern, Southern and Park Districts.

The Report (page 9) asserts that the functions performed by 30 personnel presently assigned to district stations who perform such tasks as towing from driveways, towing abandoned autos, and citing marked zones on complaints can be reassigned to another unit and that the 30 personnel can, in effect, be dropped from the needed strength of the Department. To support that assertion, reference is made to that section of the Report (page 29) which addresses the parking control function; that section points to ways in which that function can be made more efficient, however, nowhere in the discussion is the data presented which would concretely support the elimination of 30 personnel elsewhere who perform functions not now being performed by parking controllers assigned to the Traffic Division. Nowhere in the Report is the function being performed by traffic officers assigned to district stations described, let alone measured. Undoubtedly increased productivity should be attained in many units of the Department, but a showing should be made in detail as to how the function can be absorbed elsewhere before 30 positions are removed from the Department.

The source from which the Analyst extracted the data to support the number of district police officers needed to perform non-called-for service patrol functions consisted of daily assignment sheets for a two-week period in January, which showed the assignment of each officer in district stations for that period. There are many legitimate functions (other than responding to called-for services) which patrol officers perform which are not included in the two-week period sampled. Because of the time period within which the report must be responded to, it is not possible to quantify over a year's period how many police officers such activities would translate into. A listing of examples will have to suffice:

1. The recent Chinese New Year's Parade required 300 officers to police. Other parades which required policing during 1978 (usually at lower levels of staffing) include the Cherry Blossom Parade, the St. Patrick's Day Parade, Latin American Fiesta Parade, Gay Freedom Day Parade, Columbus Day Parade, and the Parade to Commemorate the Independence Day of the Republic of China.
2. Other events which required substantial numbers of police officers to police include outside traffic details on each day of the Giants baseball schedule, outside traffic details on each day of the 49'rs football schedule, the Independence Day Celebration, the Halloween celebration on Polk Street, and the New Year's Eve celebration on Broadway Street.
3. Over 100 demonstration and picketing situations in 1978 required some degree of police attention.

Other factors which result in a diminution of officers available for duty in district stations are:

1. Not all supervisory positions temporarily vacated due to vacations or other absences are filled on a like-pay basis. However, because of the need for continuous on-the-scene supervision in the Patrol Division, temporary vacancies in supervising positions in the Patrol Division are filled. Such replacements result ultimately in the diminution of the number of Q2 police officers available to perform other police duties.
2. Units other than in the Patrol Division which must be staffed fully often do not have sufficient personnel as backups to provide internal reliefs when temporary unanticipated vacancies occur (e.g., the Operations Center and the Communications Division). Consequently, temporary reliefs are drawn from among Patrol Division personnel.
3. At times, the Patrol Division is called upon to provide dignitary security (e.g., visiting dignitaries, the Mayor, and members of the Board of Supervisors). On one occasion the equivalent of 60 police officers were occupied over a period of time performing such activities.

The Report addresses the need to police special events (page 13) and recommends that the personnel used for these purposes be assigned to the Crime Specific Division. No estimates of the number of officers needed to police the above mentioned special events is included in the Report, therefore it is assumed that the Budget Analyst intends that such details be absorbed by the increased number of persons assigned to the Crime Specific Division (from 80 personnel to 240 personnel). If so, the ability of the Crime Specific Division to respond to crime conditions in various portions of the city will be reduced to the extent that they are providing police services at parades and demonstrations now being provided by district station officers. It is a reasonable recommendation that the activities be consolidated into one unit but it must be understood then that the proposed increase in the Crime Specific Division will not then translate directly into an ability to impact on crime.

Furthermore, the need to provide for like-pay/like-work reliefs, temporary reliefs in other units of the department which have no backup staff, and dignitary security, from among officers of the Patrol Division are examples of activities presently being performed which seem not to be accounted for by the Budget Analyst in his calculations which result in a recommended number of officers needed to police the city.

To continue with the analysis of the recommended sworn strength of 1,677, the Report recommends in the table on page 4 that 100 sworn positions be assigned to the administration of the Department. That number was arrived at by totalling the number of sworn positions remaining if our conversion program were completed and adding 17 more conversion positions identified by the Budget Analyst. However,

in a later table (page 5) the Budget Analyst set the staffing of the administrative functions at 120 based on an increased staff of 1,971.

The Traffic Division is set at 142 sworn positions (the current actual number of positions filled plus 21 positions in the Accident Investigation Section which are not filled because of a shortage of manpower) and the Investigation Bureau is set at 325 positions (the current actual number of positions filled plus the number of investigative vacancies). The number of persons on disability has been halved from 100 to 50 (a matter which will be discussed in that section of the report dealing with disability), the number of positions assigned to officers undergoing recruit training has been set at 120, and the number assigned as supervisors in the Municipal Security unit has been set at 10.

As mentioned above, the staffing levels of many units of the department (e.g. Internal Affairs Division) have been set at their existing level out of necessity due to the current shortage of manpower and in an attempt to keep as many officers on patrol as possible. To set the current level of those units at the level of staffing actually needed, without considering what work is being done and not being done, is, at best, imprecise.

In summary, regarding the number of officers needed to provide police services to the City, the Budget Analyst has attempted to do something that no other city has ever been able to do. The method used has consisted of determining the number of officers needed to respond to called-for services, (assuming that more one-officer cars will be used), estimating (with no quantified foundation) the number of officers needed to provide patrol duties other than called-for services, setting some units at their presumed authorized strength, assuming that the actual strength of the other units is sufficient to fulfill their mission, and further assuming that station consolidation and a reduction in officers on disability will take place. It is our conclusion that the necessary data to support an authorized strength of 1,677 police officers is not contained in the Report.

In a section titled "Inefficient Deployment" (page 10) the Report includes a table which compares the percentages of personnel, radio units, calls for service and stacked calls by watch of the day:

<u>WATCH</u>	<u>% PERSONNEL</u>	<u>% RADIO UNITS</u>	<u>% CALLS FOR SERVICE</u>	<u>STACKED CALLS</u>
1st Watch: 11pm to 7am or 12am to 8am	28.7	29.4	27.6	22.3
2nd Watch: 7am to 3pm or 8am to 4pm	35.7	36.8	29.4	5.6
3rd Watch: 3pm to 11pm or 4pm to 12am	35.6	33.8	43.0	62.1

and concludes that:

"As can be seen from the above, the assignment of personnel by watch does not correspond to the demand for service as measured by citizen-initiated calls for service and calls awaiting assignment to available units. There is excess coverage during daytime hours and insufficient coverage during evening hours."

Our own count of the number of marked cars available to respond to called-for service assignments for the period from February 1, 1979, through February 19, 1979, disclosed that the percentage of radio cars correspond more closely to the percentage of calls for service by watch:

<u>WATCH</u>	<u>% PERSONNEL</u>	<u>% RADIO UNITS</u>	<u>% CALLS FOR SERVICE</u>	<u>STACKED CALLS</u>
1st Watch: 11pm to 7am or 12am to 8am	28.7	28.8	27.6	22.3
2nd Watch: 7am to 3pm or 8am to 4pm	32.3	34.4	29.4	5.6
3rd Watch 3pm to 11pm or 4pm to 12am	38.2	36.8	43.0	62.1

Furthermore, the figure which shows proportionately more radio cars assigned during the Day Watch does not take into account that the one-officer cars (9%) we field are assigned principally to the Day Watch, which skews the figures because we double the number of units when we use one-officer cars. Also, we field supplementary units during the high crime hours of 7pm and 3am nightly which do not show on the table because they are assigned to respond to ongoing crimes and, thus are not required to respond routinely to calls for service, even though they often do so.

The section further states:

"Patrol personnel assignments are controlled at two levels within the Police Department's Field Operations Bureau. The Deputy Chief in charge of Field Operations determines the number of personnel to be assigned on a district basis by allocating police officers in proportion to various measures of criminal activity and calls for service. Once the determination of the number of personnel to be assigned on a district basis is made (performed monthly) the matter of assigning personnel on a watch basis (i.e. by time of day) is delegated to the District Captains. These assignments are apparently made without consideration of the demand for service and the need to equalize the workload in order to reduce the waiting time during which patrol units are not available to respond to calls for service and provide for adequate preventive patrol time. Part of the problem is an apparent lack of information and analytical support to assist

this decision-making process resulting from the fact that the SFPD depends on manual processing of deployment data. Also, the demand for service does not correspond precisely to the eight-hour shift assignment and peak periods often overlap two patrol shifts during which there are different levels of assigned personnel." (Emphasis added.)

As the Budget Analyst undoubtedly discovered, it is extremely time-consuming to obtain manually the data required to make decisions relative to staffing by time of day for even a one-time study. We need the same information on a continuing basis to make rational deployment decisions and in the absence of the appropriate technological support (Computer Assisted Dispatch), we will be required to assign an inordinate number of personnel to obtain the information which we need by manual methods.

In a section titled "One-person Patrol Units (page 12) it is recommended that we increase our number of one-officer cars responding to calls for service from 9% to 30%. Not mentioned in this section, but implicit in a previous section (page 8), is the recommendation that the increase in one-officer vehicles should be accomplished by removing one officer from present two-officer cars and not by increasing the number of cars. As mentioned previously, it is axiomatic in the police service that when two-officer cars are converted to one-officer cars, the number of vehicles be increased to provide for officer safety. The Report addresses the concern for officer safety by stating that it is already the common procedure to dispatch multiple units for situations considered to be emergencies. The last published FBI Uniform Crime Report (1977) states that most police officers assaulted (31.9%) are victimized"...responding to disturbance calls (family quarrels, man with a gun, etc.)." The FBI makes no distinction statistically between those disturbances which involve weapons and those who do not but it is our practice to send one unit on disturbance calls where no weapon is involved (by far the largest percentage of such calls). Therefore, although we endorse the concept of increased numbers of one-officer cars, it would be irresponsible on our part to convert two-officer cars to one-officer cars without providing sufficient vehicles to assure officer safety on those calls with a potential for escalating into serious disturbances.

We submit that the Report has not made a showing that 1,677 officers are sufficient to perform the functions required in the Patrol Division, provides insufficient numbers of personnel to impact on serious crime, and is unclear in its recommendation as to how additional personnel should be located organizationally or employed functionally.

SECOND FINDING

Consolidation of District Stations

"Consolidating the existing nine district stations into three patrol stations will improve police services and free 59 police officers who are currently assigned to station duty for more active patrol assignments."

We endorse fully the recommendation (page 21) that the current nine district stations be consolidated into three. The consolidation of the stations is so important that we will comment even though we are in complete agreement.

The Report states in a conclusion (page 20) that the management of the patrol function would be greatly enhanced by consolidated district stations. We agree completely and will elaborate:

1. The services of one full employee is currently required to maintain a courier service to deliver intra-department mail to eight decentralized locations. Even so, there are often delays in the deliveries caused by the number of locations which must be served.
2. An employee must take between two and three hours daily to make a round of the eight decentralized stations to pick up evidentiary property and bail money accepted at district stations which must be to the court by 9:00 a.m. daily.
3. Elsewhere (page 11) the Report states that in one seven-day period there were 16 instances in which there was no sergeant assigned for duty in specific patrol districts and watches. When the smallest unit from which reliefs can be made is one watch in a single district station which has from three to five sergeants assigned, any exceptional absences on the part of a sergeant (e.g. sick leave) can result in no sergeant being available on the watch. (It can be argued that procedures can be established to obtain a sergeant from another watch in another district and such procedures have been established. However, given the fragmented communications inherent in a nine-district configuration, such a procedure is not always followed. Also, a sergeant assigned temporarily from a different organizational unit is unfamiliar with both the area and the personnel to be supervised.) With a three-district configuration, the pool of resources from which reliefs can be drawn is enlarged. (The same point can be made with reference to pooling marked police vehicles.)
4. At present, if senior personnel wish to address patrol officers directly on matters of importance it is necessary to schedule at least 27 addresses (nine stations multiplied by three watches to a station), an impossible task.
5. A significant disadvantage is the resulting complications in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling nine district stations.

6. There would be substantially more effective communications with personnel with fewer stations, hence enhancing understanding of programs and goals, eliminating rumors, and generally, reducing work-related morale problems.

The examples of how the management and operation of the Department is complicated and rendered deficient by the existence of nine district stations is endless. We are doing our best to provide the most police service possible under present conditions, while recognizing that the nine district station configuration is costly, inefficient, and less effective than consolidation would permit of.

THIRD FINDING

Police Response Time

"Improvements in the responsiveness of patrol units could be achieved without the addition of sworn personnel."

After a discussion regarding response times and some of the factors which contribute to deficiencies in this area, a series of recommendations is made, one of which requires further discussion:

"The Dispatch function of the Communications Division (Bureau of Support Services) should be placed under the direct management control of the Deputy Chief in charge of Field Operations. This will permit improved coordination between the two key elements of emergency response capability. The accountability of the dispatch function would be placed under the division of the SFPD most affected by its performance. Improved control of the quality of information provided to the patrol allocation decision process will result."

We now have the means of providing the necessary inter-unit inspection and coordination of activities to assure that all aspects of emergency response procedures are complied with. First, we presently have a directive pertaining to radio response procedures in the meet-and-confer process which, when implemented and enforced, will address the problems raised. The order provides a systematized procedure to recall officers from lower-priority assignments and reassign them to high priority assignments which arise when officers are occupied with the lower-priority assignments. Furthermore, the order contains a forced inspectional device by means of which radio dispatchers will record any instances when an officer does not answer radio calls on his alternate (hand) radio when reassigned by the Communications Division to a higher-priority assignment while he is out of service on a lower-priority call. The order calls for daily reports to the Deputy Chief of Field Operations of any non-compliance with the order. When the order is implemented and enforced, officers will be subject to and, in fact, will be available to handle higher priority calls in a more timely way.

Secondly, we are realizing more effective management of the dispatch function and will ultimately achieve optimal conditions under the present organizational structure. The Deputy Chief of Field Operations

commands units of such size and complexity that it is not reasonable for him or his subordinates to undertake the management of the dispatch function.

FOURTH FINDING

Excessive Disability

"The San Francisco Police Department has excessive numbers of police officers who are on disability leave due to accidents and injuries."

The Report states (page 28) that there is an excessive number of police officers on disability leave and implies that the establishment of physical fitness standards for all its officers would reduce the disability rate; the Budget Analyst staff agrees that there is no necessary causal relationship between the type of physical fitness standards now imposed and the level of officers on disability leave.

We do not have an established physical fitness standard which must be met by all police officers. There is a semi-annual physical fitness test that is required of all police officers, between the ages of 21 and 50, appointed after March 16, 1970; officers appointed prior to that time have no physical fitness requirement because in 1970 the Police Commission decided that physical fitness standards should not be applied retroactively.

We will research the feasibility and the legality of developing and imposing fitness standards on all sworn personnel regardless of their date of entry. The standards will be incorporated into a physical development program which will be directed towards maintaining body fitness and reducing the type and number of disabilities incurred by departmental members.

The Police Department is not solely responsible for the disability rate of its members. Once a member is on disability status because of a job-incurred injury, he is virtually under the direction and control of the Retirement Board physician who treats his disability. The department must await a release from the attending physician prior to ordering the member's return to duty. If the member is not pressed by his physician to return to duty when he is fit, the disability leave is unnecessarily lengthened; a situation which the Department is powerless to remedy.

The report is correct in its conclusion that there is an economic incentive for an officer to take and remain on disability leave; officers do earn more money when they are on disability leave than when they are on active duty. It is correct to infer that some unknown number of officers remain on disability status unnecessarily because of the economic incentive.

The Department will adopt the goal of reducing disability leaves by 50%, while recognizing that many of the factors which contribute to the rate of disability leaves are beyond our control.

We will also explore the development and implementation of physical training standards and programs for all its members which will be directed towards reducing injuries to back, knee and ankle, and which will stress general physical conditioning. However, there is no factual showing that a change in physical agility standards will necessarily result in a reduction by half of officers on disability leave.

FIFTH FINDING

Parking Control

"Replacement of non-sworn parking control officers by sworn police officers and a development of performance goals for parking control could increase police presence, increase revenue to the general fund by an estimated \$6 million annually."

The Report makes two major points in this section:

1. That productivity on the part of persons performing parking control functions can be increased.
2. That parking control officers should be replaced by officers from among the 273 officers who will remain when the Budget Analyst's recommended 1,697* sworn strength is subtracted from the 1,971 mandated by the consent decree.

With regard to the first point, we tend to agree with the Budget Analyst that the productivity of parking control officers can be increased, as can that of other members of the department. We have been and will continue to make efforts to increase productivity within the limitations of our ability to staff supervisory positions at the present time and our capacity to acquire and analyze management information which will lead to greater productivity.

With regard to the second point, as set forth in the response to the first finding (above), we do not agree that a showing has been made that 1,697 officers can provide the needed police services to the City. Furthermore, we believe that by assigning 155 police officers to functions presently performed by parking control officers we will not have sufficient police officers to impact on crime problems in the City other than by displaying a large number of officers on the street.

* When the Report shifts between page 4 and page 5 from its recommended departmental strength of 1677 to its recommendation of how 1971 positions should be used, 20 sworn positions which were recommended for conversion to civilian positions on page 4 are returned to sworn positions on page 5, thus increasing the basic sworn strength needed to provide police services from 1677 to 1697.

To gain a full understanding of this issue, it is necessary to show how the Report recommends that personnel be used to staff present and proposed functions. According to the Budget Analyst's projections of what it takes to provide basic police services (with which we do not agree) there should be a total of 433 sworn officers, including supervisors (the additional 160 officers assigned to the Crime Specific Division and the 273 position difference between the Analyst's recommended strength of 1,697 and the consent decree mandating 1,971). The functions which the 433 personnel are intended to perform are:

1. Muni Security 88 (page 5)
 2. Parking Control 155 (page 5)
 3. City Hall Security 22 (page 5)
 4. In a later finding (page 33) the Report recommends that 19 traffic control officers be replaced by police officers.
 5. On page 14, the Report mentions, but does not quantify, that expanded Muni Security can be provided by the Crime Specific Division when Muni Metro goes underground (departmental estimates at this time point to 28 additional personnel being needed to perform the function).
 6. An unspecified number of officers (page 12) to provide a pool of officers to police all demonstrations, parades, and events now being policed by officers not assigned to called-for service response in district stations.

When the number of personnel that the Report recommends we use for quasi-police functions are added together and subtracted from the 433 officers in question, approximately 120 additional officers remain to combat crime by means of directed patrol in the neighborhoods of the City and to provide the equivalent of all of the officers presently drawn from district stations to police parades, special events and demonstrations, to fill in on all like work/like pay replacements, to provide backup reliefs for vacancies in other departmental units and to provide dignitary security when needed.

The effect of following the recommendation, specifically as it refers to parking control officers and, more generally, as it refers to the distribution of sworn personnel throughout the department, will be that we will have almost no increased ability to direct our efforts in such a way as to impact directly on crime.

The recommendation to replace current non-sworn members with police officers performing quasi-police functions is imaginative, and, in terms of pure fiscal logic, seems to make sense. However, additional officers acquired by this means will not be able to perform directed patrol work. They will be occupied principally by writing parking

citations or will be posted on fixed security details. There will be the appearance of many more police officers in the City (which is desirable) but our real ability to direct our effort toward specific crime problems in the neighborhoods of the City will not be increased.

SIXTH AND SEVENTH FINDINGS

Traffic Control

"Replacing traffic control officers with police officers would increase police presence in the congested downtown area and would produce savings of over \$300,000 annually."

City Hall Security

"Providing private security guards to improve City Hall security would require an expenditure of \$515,000 annually. Considering the settlement requirement that San Francisco maintain 1,971 sworn police personnel, the SFPD will have sufficient manpower to assign 22 police officers to City Hall security at no additional cost."

The arguments which compelled us to disagree with the preceding finding (parking control) also applies to the replacement of traffic control officers and City Hall security positions.

It is appropriate at this point in our response to summarize how the organization of the department would appear if the Report's recommendations were followed and how it would look if we were allowed to organize in a way that will impact on crime.

Page 5 of the Report contains a table which shows a recommended distribution of all department employees. According to the table and supported by the text of the Report, the basic patrol function would be performed by 690 officers of all ranks assigned to three district stations. Their duties would include:

1. Responding to all calls for service (with insufficient officers to perform the function (page 8);
2. Providing wagon transportation service (understaffed) (page 9);
3. Providing civilian dress patrol (station investigators) at the current level (page 9);
4. Providing school patrols at the current level (page 9);
5. Providing foot patrol at the current level (page 9);
6. Administering the district stations.

Additionally, the Report recommends (page 31) that the 155 officers who replace parking control officers be decentralized to the three district stations where they will perform the functions now being

performed by civilian parking control officers, plus those presently being performed by an additional 30 officers in district stations.

No organizational location is specifically recommended for the 19 police officers who are to replace traffic controllers (page 35) or the 22 officers who will take over the City Hall security function (page 35).

The three district stations will then have a combined total assigned strength of 845 personnel plus the possible addition of another 41 for a grand total of 886 police officers.

With regard to the Crime Specific Division, the Report recommends that its staffing level be set at 240 officers. The Analyst intends also to locate the Muni Security force of 88 police officers in the Crime Specific Division (page 14). The Crime Specific Division would then have a total staffing of 328. Its staffing and functions would include:

1. The 80 officers now assigned to perform the functions they are now performing;
2. Eighty-eight police officers to perform the work now performed by non-sworn security officers (Municipal Transit Security);
3. Twenty-eight police officers to perform additional security duties assumed when Muni Metro goes underground. (The Report recognizes and alludes to the need but does not quantify it.)

When the officers and functions specified are subtracted from the Division strength of 328, less than 120 officers remain to provide all the functions mentioned on page 4 and 5 of our response and to provide what other directed patrol activities we wish to undertake. As shown, there will be few officers to provide any additional specific services to impact on crime in the neighborhoods of the City.

Officers performing patrol and related functions totally will number approximately 1,214 and there will be no discernable additional impact on specific crime problems except as would be provided by general increased visibility:

District Stations:	476 (to respond to called-for services)
	57 (to administer the stations)
	157 (to perform supplementary patrol-related duties in district stations)
	155 (to operate as parking control officers)
	19 (to operate as traffic control officers)
	22 (to provide City Hall security)
Subtotal	886
Crime Specific Division:	240 (to perform duties as specified above)
	88 (to staff the Muni Security Program, not counting the need to police Muni Metro underground)
Subtotal	328
TOTAL	1,214

The table on page 5 of the Report then allots 142 positions to the Traffic Division, 120 positions to perform administrative functions, 325 positions to the Investigation Bureau, 50 positions to disability leave and 120 to recruit training. The grand total of sworn positions thus amounts to 1,971 and, as shown above, almost none will be available to perform directed patrol activities against specific crime problems should the recommendation be followed.

As mentioned previously, the Budget Analyst's recommended distribution of personnel (and the filling of 220 deleted civilian positions with police officers) could be construed as making sense from a purely fiscal point of view. However, as we have shown, if such a recommendation were followed, the City would be able to realize almost no additional impact on crime, even at an increased staffing level of 1,971 sworn positions. It is our position that we should seize the opportunity to use the additional officers to affect the level of crime currently present in the City. Such an effect can only be realized by deploying additional officers (with no other routine or quasi-police responsibilities) into specific areas of the city on an as-needed basis, based upon crime experience as revealed by an analysis of crime.

The Department would use personnel realized by filling a sworn strength of 1,971 in the following manner:

1. The nine district stations would be consolidated into three (subject to the appropriate approvals) as recommended but their staffing levels would remain as they are and the personnel realized by freeing up persons currently performing station duty would be assigned to additional foot beats in the neighborhoods of the City under the district stations. At present, most foot beats are covered only part-time, depending on the number of officers remaining when we provide officers to staff radio cars to respond to called-for services (examples of areas which require full-time foot beat officers are Visitation Valley, the Tenderloin, the Inner Sunset, Eureka Valley, and the Haight Street area). The Report makes no provision for additional foot beats but expects to accomplish the same purpose by the assignment of officers to parking control beats which function will occupy most of their time writing parking citations and towing vehicles.
2. There are presently 1,620 filled police officer positions in the police department. At a filled authorized strength of 1,971 we would assign the additional 351 positions (less those filled by officers undergoing recruit training) to the Crime Specific Division to impact on specific serious crimes throughout the City.

Experience has shown that the most effective way to impact on crime is by the deployment of a large flexible force of officers, who have no other primary responsibilities, in a focused way into those areas

where crimes are occurring, when the crimes are taking place.

The Report's recommendations would lock large numbers of police officers into the primary performance of routine and quasi-police functions with no resultant, meaningful affect on crime. Our method of distributing personnel would provide a large flexible force of officers to impact directly on crime. We must emphatically state that our method of employing additional officers will be substantially more effective: our method will reduce the response time to calls (see page 6 and 7 of our response for present average response time), reduce the "stack call" factor, and, most importantly, result in crime prevention, reduction and, hence, citizen safety.

NINTH FINDING

Vehicle Use

"The Police Department has too many vehicles and makes inadequate use of those vehicles."

After a discussion which points out that the Department vehicle fleet has grown while the actual strength of the department has decreased, that many vehicles have low recorded mileage use, and that vehicles are often standing idle in the Hall of Justice garage and at district stations, the Report makes several recommendations, among which are:

1. Centralize all unmarked police cars in one vehicle pool which is controlled by personnel in the Hall of Justice Garage.
2. Centralize all backup marked police cars at the Hall of Justice Garage and allocate them on an as-needed basis to the various stations and units.
3. Place a moratorium on the purchase of new police vehicles and eliminate 50 unmarked police cars from the vehicle fleet.

We agree that we should have one vehicle pool which is controlled by personnel in the Hall of Justice Garage. Several attempts have been made over the years to establish such a pool but all have failed because of circumstances beyond our control. An essential element of a vehicle pool is that all vehicles be assembled in one location where they can be dispatched by garage personnel through one point of entrance and departure (where ignition keys can be issued, damage checks can be performed, and fuel levels and maintenance requirements can be monitored) by personnel specifically assigned to the dispatch function.

As the Report notes (page 41) "Our review of vehicle utilization revealed that there is a severe parking shortage...in the Hall of Justice Garage... Due to these crowded conditions, the Police Department has reserved curb lanes on either side of the Hall of Justice for police vehicles." Not mentioned is the fact that we also used a parking lot

annex near the Hall of Justice where police vehicles are parked temporarily.

Efforts to date to acquire the capability of providing a genuine vehicle pool have included a capital improvement request which will locate the garage office at a place in the garage where staff can control the dispatch of vehicles and the unsuccessful attempt to locate a parking lot near the Hall of Justice which can contain all department vehicles so that all can be dispatched and returned through one control point.

The Report makes the point with regard to security (page 41) that the personnel who work in the Hall of Justice Garage have no visual contact with police vehicles which are parked outside the garage. The point also bears on the establishment of a vehicle pool. Unless there is one dispatch point through which all vehicles must pass and by means of which specifically assigned personnel can maintain physical control of all vehicles, the basic control principle upon which pools are established is defeated.

It is because of the foregoing reasons that departmental vehicles are assigned to mini-pools under the responsibility of unit commanders until such time as we obtain the necessary facility to establish a genuine pool. When we get such a location, we can get better use of our vehicles.

With regard to the recommendation that we centralize all backup marked police vehicles in the Hall of Justice, the Report makes the point that, "...each district station attempts to keep at least one backup vehicle in case one of their primary cars malfunctions." The purpose for maintaining such backups is so that travel time from and to locations (other district stations) where backup cars are available is kept to a minimum. The establishment of such a backup pool in the Hall of Justice would add to the existing congestion in the Hall of Justice (as pointed out in the Report) and would contribute to the travel time expended in going to the Hall of Justice from a decentralized district station to pick up a relief car (two units would be lost during the pickup: the one transporting the officer to the Hall of Justice and the officer being transported). If the recommendation to consolidate district stations is carried out, the problem of maintaining backups of marked vehicles will be largely solved.

Relative to the recommendation that the vehicle fleet be reduced by 50 vehicles, it must be emphasized that throughout the Report it is assumed that we will attain a sworn strength of 1,971. A large part of the appearance of under-utilization of unmarked vehicles is caused by the fact that we presently have a large number of investigative vacancies which will be filled as we increase to a sworn strength of 1,971. Investigators need vehicles. Furthermore, if we are going to increase our overall actual strength by almost 300 personnel, still more vehicles will be needed.



C124924274

TENTH FINDING

Vehicle Maintenance and Repair

"The maintenance and repair program for police vehicles is inadequate and costly and contributes to an under-utilization of police vehicles."

After a discussion of the city vehicle maintenance program which points to deficiencies in accounting on work performed on police vehicles, the Report pointed up problems with departmental maintenance practices and made a series of recommendations some of which require further discussion:

1. Fill the vacant fleet manager position.
2. Establish a policy whereby police vehicles are periodically reassigned so as to provide for uniform use.
3. Maintain in each vehicle a maintenance and repair history file indicating all repair by description, cost, time spent and parts replaced. This file should also specify a regular preventive maintenance schedule and should provide a mechanism for verifying that the prescribed maintenance schedule is followed.
4. Establish a policy whereby all drivers inspect their vehicles at the beginning and end of each shift and document all malfunctions and all body damage.
5. Establish a policy whereby all police vehicles are picked up from the Central Shop garage within four hours of the time when work on those vehicles is completed.

Many of the problems encountered which resulted in the above list of recommendations can be resolved by the establishment of a vehicle pool as described in the preceding section. Pool vehicles can be dispatched in such a way that all vehicles will have approximately equal mileage, maintenance records can be maintained in the pool office, vehicles will be inspected for damage on dispatch and return, and better controls can be maintained so that vehicles will be picked up more promptly when repairs are completed at the Central Shops.

As to the filling of the vacant fleet manager's position, we await the Civil Service classification procedure.